Farrell A Tobolowsky,Eric Morris,Lina Castro,Tina Schaff,Monica Jacinto,Joseph P Clement,Min Z Levine,Julia C Frederick,Feng Liu,Crystal Holiday,Marie K Kirby,C Todd Davis,Krista Kniss,Sonja J Olsen,Rahil Ryder,Debra A Wadford,Godfred Masinde,George Han,A Danielle Iuliano,Seema Jain
{"title":"Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Infection in a Child with No Known Exposure - San Francisco, California, December 2024-January 2025.","authors":"Farrell A Tobolowsky,Eric Morris,Lina Castro,Tina Schaff,Monica Jacinto,Joseph P Clement,Min Z Levine,Julia C Frederick,Feng Liu,Crystal Holiday,Marie K Kirby,C Todd Davis,Krista Kniss,Sonja J Olsen,Rahil Ryder,Debra A Wadford,Godfred Masinde,George Han,A Danielle Iuliano,Seema Jain","doi":"10.15585/mmwr.mm7433a2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In response to a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) outbreak in U.S. dairy cows detected in March 2024, with subsequent identification of human cases, the San Francisco Department of Public Health instituted enhanced influenza surveillance (influenza A virus subtyping of a sample of specimens weekly) in June 2024. As of January 1, 2025, 37 human cases of influenza A(H5N1) had been detected in California, none of which occurred in San Francisco. On January 9, 2025, enhanced surveillance detected a human influenza A(H5N1) virus genotype B3.13 infection in a school-aged child in San Francisco with mild illness. Case investigation and contact tracing were conducted to ascertain exposures and detect possible human-to-human transmission. Activities comprised a household visit that included an environmental assessment, close contact interviews and surveys, and molecular and serologic testing. Sixty-seven close contacts (household, school, and health care) were identified. Upper respiratory tract specimens collected from seven asymptomatic household contacts and four symptomatic school contacts all tested negative for influenza virus by real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR). Although antibodies against influenza A(H5N1) were detected in the index patient, serologic testing of a convenience sample of nine close contacts identified no detectable A(H5)-specific antibodies. Despite an extensive investigation, the infection source remains unknown; no human-to-human transmission was identified among close contacts by rRT-PCR and serologic testing. Continued enhanced surveillance and timely subtyping of a subset of influenza A-positive specimens are essential components of a comprehensive strategy to detect human novel influenza A virus infections, including among persons without known exposures to A(H5N1) viruses.","PeriodicalId":18931,"journal":{"name":"Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report","volume":"22 1","pages":"522-527"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7433a2","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In response to a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) outbreak in U.S. dairy cows detected in March 2024, with subsequent identification of human cases, the San Francisco Department of Public Health instituted enhanced influenza surveillance (influenza A virus subtyping of a sample of specimens weekly) in June 2024. As of January 1, 2025, 37 human cases of influenza A(H5N1) had been detected in California, none of which occurred in San Francisco. On January 9, 2025, enhanced surveillance detected a human influenza A(H5N1) virus genotype B3.13 infection in a school-aged child in San Francisco with mild illness. Case investigation and contact tracing were conducted to ascertain exposures and detect possible human-to-human transmission. Activities comprised a household visit that included an environmental assessment, close contact interviews and surveys, and molecular and serologic testing. Sixty-seven close contacts (household, school, and health care) were identified. Upper respiratory tract specimens collected from seven asymptomatic household contacts and four symptomatic school contacts all tested negative for influenza virus by real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR). Although antibodies against influenza A(H5N1) were detected in the index patient, serologic testing of a convenience sample of nine close contacts identified no detectable A(H5)-specific antibodies. Despite an extensive investigation, the infection source remains unknown; no human-to-human transmission was identified among close contacts by rRT-PCR and serologic testing. Continued enhanced surveillance and timely subtyping of a subset of influenza A-positive specimens are essential components of a comprehensive strategy to detect human novel influenza A virus infections, including among persons without known exposures to A(H5N1) viruses.
为应对2024年3月在美国奶牛中发现的高致病性禽流感(HPAI) a (H5N1)暴发,以及随后发现的人类病例,旧金山公共卫生部于2024年6月加强了流感监测(每周对样本样本进行甲型流感病毒亚型分型)。截至2025年1月1日,加利福尼亚州已发现37例甲型H5N1流感人间病例,其中没有一例发生在旧金山。2025年1月9日,加强监测在旧金山一名病情轻微的学龄儿童中发现了人类甲型H5N1病毒基因型B3.13感染。进行了病例调查和接触者追踪,以确定接触并发现可能的人际传播。活动包括家访,其中包括环境评估、密切接触者访谈和调查以及分子和血清学检测。确定了67名密切接触者(家庭、学校和卫生保健机构)。从7名无症状家庭接触者和4名有症状学校接触者采集的上呼吸道标本经实时逆转录聚合酶链反应(rRT-PCR)检测均为流感病毒阴性。虽然在指数患者中检测到甲型H5N1流感抗体,但对9名密切接触者的方便样本进行血清学检测未发现可检测到的甲型H5流感特异性抗体。尽管进行了广泛调查,但感染源仍然未知;通过rRT-PCR和血清学检测未发现密切接触者之间的人际传播。继续加强监测和及时对甲型流感阳性标本亚群进行分型是发现人类新型甲型流感病毒感染的综合战略的重要组成部分,包括在没有已知接触过甲型H5N1病毒的人群中。