On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement

IF 1 4区经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-22 DOI:10.1111/joie.12415

Adam Pigoń, Gyula Seres

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study estimates the effect of screening and litigation using a unique data set on highway construction procurement auctions in Poland. Procurement authorities frequently use screening to mitigate default risk. However, eliminating bidders reduces competition and may discourage entry. The examined market exhibits a screening method that ex-post selects eligible offers. We demonstrate with a reduced-form model that this method disproportionately affects small firms and decreases entry, indirectly inflating bids and prices as a consequence.

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论采购中筛选的竞争效应

本研究估计的影响筛选和诉讼使用一个独特的数据集对公路建设采购拍卖在波兰。采购当局经常使用筛选来降低违约风险。然而，取消竞标者会减少竞争，并可能阻碍进入。被审查的市场表现出事后选择合格报价的筛选方法。我们用一个简化形式的模型证明，这种方法不成比例地影响小企业并减少进入，从而间接地抬高出价和价格。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Industrial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.