{"title":"Environmental regulation and firms’ extensive margin decisions","authors":"Shuo Li , Min Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2025.103224","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper explores the impacts of environmental regulation on Chinese firms’ extensive margin decisions and resulting changes in market structure and competitiveness. We find that environmental regulation significantly deters firm entry in pollution-intensive industries, while its impact on firm exit is negligible, revealing an asymmetric impact at the extensive margin. The theoretical model and empirical evidence suggest that regulation raises average productivity by selecting against low-productivity entrants and allowing high-productivity firms to enter at smaller scales. We also test for spatial spillovers and find no substantial firm relocation to unregulated areas. These results highlight market selection as a key mechanism through which environmental regulation reshapes industrial dynamics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15763,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","volume":"133 ","pages":"Article 103224"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069625001081","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The paper explores the impacts of environmental regulation on Chinese firms’ extensive margin decisions and resulting changes in market structure and competitiveness. We find that environmental regulation significantly deters firm entry in pollution-intensive industries, while its impact on firm exit is negligible, revealing an asymmetric impact at the extensive margin. The theoretical model and empirical evidence suggest that regulation raises average productivity by selecting against low-productivity entrants and allowing high-productivity firms to enter at smaller scales. We also test for spatial spillovers and find no substantial firm relocation to unregulated areas. These results highlight market selection as a key mechanism through which environmental regulation reshapes industrial dynamics.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management publishes theoretical and empirical papers devoted to specific natural resources and environmental issues. For consideration, papers should (1) contain a substantial element embodying the linkage between economic systems and environmental and natural resources systems or (2) be of substantial importance in understanding the management and/or social control of the economy in its relations with the natural environment. Although the general orientation of the journal is toward economics, interdisciplinary papers by researchers in other fields of interest to resource and environmental economists will be welcomed.