Conflict victimization shapes norms of rule compliance: Evidence from Colombia

Abstract

This study explores how conflict victimization influences civilians’ tendency to comply (or not) with armed actors, a behavioral measure which is elicited through a lab-in-the field experiment in Meta, Colombia. Violence could promote compliance or non-compliance depending on whether a “fear of punishment” or a “taste for retribution” dominates. I find that conflict victimization increases rule violations against the main insurgent group (the FARC-EP) but has no effect on participants’ tendency to violate rules associated with the Colombian Armed Forces. The link between victimization and non-compliance with the FARC-EP is explained by the more frequent victimization of civilians by the insurgent group, suggesting that violent targeting of civilians fosters resistance rather than submission. I support a causal interpretation through an instrumental variable approach that leverages the distance to a historic front-line as an instrument for victimization.