Maxmin, coalitions and evolution

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-08-12 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.002

Jonathan Newton, Miharu Naono

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Maxmin decision making can take place at an individual or a coalitional level. We allow evolution to choose between the two, determining the relative shares of individual and coalitional decision making. We consider factors that favor or disfavor the evolution of coalitionality and apply our framework to social dilemmas, oligopolistic price competition and voting on committees.

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Maxmin，联盟和进化

最大限度的决策可以在个人或联盟层面进行。我们允许进化在两者之间做出选择，决定个人和联盟决策的相对份额。我们考虑了有利于或不利于联盟性演变的因素，并将我们的框架应用于社会困境、寡头垄断价格竞争和委员会投票。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology