Kantian ethics and the dutilitarian compromise

Abstract

Martin Peterson explores a compromise between what he characterizes “textbook” Kantian ethics and utilitarianism. But what if the textbook Kantian is not in crucial respects the Kantian; indeed, what if the textbook Kantian’s duty ethics is an ethical theory purged of precisely those elements of Kantian ethical theory that not only eliminate any such drive to compromise, but even demonstrate why the quest for such a compromise might be deeply misguided? In what follows, I will take up just such an alternative interpretation of Kant, focusing in particular upon the version of this interpretation developed by Barbara Herman. I demonstrate first that on this alternative interpretation, Kantian ethical theory, although undeniably an ethics of duty, is not in Peterson’s sense a duty ethics. I then demonstrate that because Kantian ethics thus interpreted does take consequences into account, it need not compromise with utilitarianism to do so. Finally, I argue that this alternative Kantian has reasons to reject utilitarianism as a theory that appeals fundamentally to the wrong rather than the right kinds of reasons, a theory that distorts the quest in ethical theory for good reasons of the right kind.