Sovereign Debt Disclosure

IF 4 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Journal of International Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-21 DOI:10.1016/j.jinteco.2025.104118

Bulent Guler , Yasin Kürşat Önder , Temel Taskin

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper studies debt and default dynamics under alternative disclosure arrangements in a sovereign default model. The government can access both observable and hidden debt. We show that when debt is not fully disclosed, the government does not internalize the full effects of hidden debt choices on bond prices, thereby reducing the cost of holding hidden debt. We find that switching to a full disclosure regime shifts the portfolio from hidden to observable debt, exacerbating the debt dilution problem. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, this switch generates welfare losses.

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主权债务披露

本文研究了主权违约模型中不同披露安排下的债务和违约动态。政府既可以动用看得见的债务，也可以动用隐性债务。我们发现，当债务未完全披露时，政府不会将隐性债务选择对债券价格的全部影响内部化，从而降低持有隐性债务的成本。我们发现，转向全面披露制度将投资组合从隐性债务转向可观察债务，加剧了债务稀释问题。因此，与传统观点相反，这种转变会造成福利损失。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of International Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

5.80

自引率

6.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of International Economics is intended to serve as the primary outlet for theoretical and empirical research in all areas of international economics. These include, but are not limited to the following: trade patterns, commercial policy; international institutions; exchange rates; open economy macroeconomics; international finance; international factor mobility. The Journal especially encourages the submission of articles which are empirical in nature, or deal with issues of open economy macroeconomics and international finance. Theoretical work submitted to the Journal should be original in its motivation or modelling structure. Empirical analysis should be based on a theoretical framework, and should be capable of replication.