Optimal unemployment insurance with multiple applications

IF 4.1 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Monetary Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-07 DOI:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2025.103798
Shu Lin Wee
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper examines how unemployment transfers should be allocated over the business cycle. When risk-averse workers can submit multiple applications, the optimal UI policy is countercyclical. In contrast, optimal policy in a standard search model featuring one-to-one matching is procyclical. In the latter, more generous UI during a downturn discourages search effort, dampening job creation. In the former, decreased search effort aids job creation. Because firms cannot coordinate and commit to not making the same worker an offer, lower search effort by reducing the number of applications sent mitigates this coordination friction. This in turn boosts job creation incentives, supporting employment outcomes.
多重应用的最优失业保险
本文考察了失业转移应如何在经济周期中分配。当规避风险的员工可以提交多个申请时,最优UI策略是逆周期策略。相比之下,以一对一匹配为特征的标准搜索模型中的最优策略是顺周期的。在后一种情况下,在经济低迷时期,更慷慨的UI会阻碍求职努力,从而抑制就业创造。在前者,减少寻找工作有助于创造就业机会。由于公司无法协调并承诺不向同一名员工提供工作机会,因此通过减少发送的申请数量来降低搜索工作量可以缓解这种协调摩擦。这反过来又会刺激创造就业,支持就业成果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.20
自引率
4.90%
发文量
90
审稿时长
74 days
期刊介绍: The profession has witnessed over the past twenty years a remarkable expansion of research activities bearing on problems in the broader field of monetary economics. The strong interest in monetary analysis has been increasingly matched in recent years by the growing attention to the working and structure of financial institutions. The role of various institutional arrangements, the consequences of specific changes in banking structure and the welfare aspects of structural policies have attracted an increasing interest in the profession. There has also been a growing attention to the operation of credit markets and to various aspects in the behavior of rates of return on assets. The Journal of Monetary Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of this research.
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