Risk disclosure in reward-based crowdfunding: Voluntary or mandatory?

IF 8.8 1区 工程技术 Q1 ECONOMICS
Yanhong Sun , Bingqing Ouyang , Qiuyan Chen , Shuai Yan
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Reward-based crowdfunding is characterized by high uncertainty in product delivery. This intrinsic risk feature elevates risk disclosure to a strategic concern, especially in a competitive crowdfunding market: (1) when will a creator voluntarily disclose his delivery risk information? and (2) what is the impact of a platform’s mandatory risk disclosure policy (MDP)? Our analysis yields some interesting findings. In particular, the information spillover effect may promote a high-risk creator to voluntarily disclose his risk information rather than free-riding on the disclosed information of a low-risk creator, in order to mitigate market competition. However, the interplay between the spillover effect and disclosure costs may lead two creators into the trap of the prisoners’ dilemma by withholding their risk information. Our analysis also suggests that MDP does not always harm the high-risk creator due to the mitigation of the spillover effect, and it can also help resolve the prisoners’ dilemma, thereby increasing both creators’ crowdfunding performance if disclosure costs are not excessively high. Nevertheless, contrary to the intuitive expectation that MDP will protect consumers’ interests by enabling them to make informed decisions, our results indicate that MDP may actually reduce consumer surplus by increasing crowdfunding prices.
奖励众筹风险披露:自愿还是强制?
奖励众筹的特点是产品交付的不确定性高。这种内在风险特征将风险披露提升为一种战略关注,特别是在竞争激烈的众筹市场中:(1)创造者何时会主动披露其交付风险信息?(2)平台强制性风险披露政策(MDP)的影响是什么?我们的分析得出了一些有趣的发现。特别是,信息溢出效应可能促使高风险创造者自愿披露其风险信息,而不是搭便车低风险创造者披露的信息,从而缓解市场竞争。然而,溢出效应和披露成本之间的相互作用可能导致两个创造者因隐瞒风险信息而陷入囚徒困境的陷阱。我们的分析还表明,MDP并不总是损害高风险的创造者,因为它可以缓解溢出效应,并且在披露成本不过高的情况下,它还可以帮助解决囚徒困境,从而提高两个创造者的众筹绩效。然而,与我们的直觉预期相反,MDP将通过使消费者做出明智的决定来保护消费者的利益,我们的研究结果表明,MDP实际上可能通过提高众筹价格来减少消费者剩余。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
16.20
自引率
16.00%
发文量
285
审稿时长
62 days
期刊介绍: Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review is a reputable journal that publishes high-quality articles covering a wide range of topics in the field of logistics and transportation research. The journal welcomes submissions on various subjects, including transport economics, transport infrastructure and investment appraisal, evaluation of public policies related to transportation, empirical and analytical studies of logistics management practices and performance, logistics and operations models, and logistics and supply chain management. Part E aims to provide informative and well-researched articles that contribute to the understanding and advancement of the field. The content of the journal is complementary to other prestigious journals in transportation research, such as Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Part B: Methodological, Part C: Emerging Technologies, Part D: Transport and Environment, and Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour. Together, these journals form a comprehensive and cohesive reference for current research in transportation science.
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