School choice with rank-dependent priorities

IF 1.8 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2025-08-05 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112501

Yasuo Sasaki

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We extend the standard school choice problem by allowing schools’ priority orders to depend on the rankings submitted by students. In this setting, the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm using such modified priorities is no longer strategy-proof, and moreover stability and strategy-proofness are incompatible.

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与等级相关的择校优先

我们扩展了标准的择校问题，允许学校的优先顺序取决于学生提交的排名。在这种情况下，使用这种修改优先级的学生提议延迟接受算法不再具有策略防伪性，而且稳定性和策略防伪性是不相容的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.