How much work experience do you need to get your first job?

Abstract

The first step in a worker's career is often particularly hard. Many firms seeking workers require experience in a related field, so a vicious circle is created, whereby an entry level job is required in order to get an entry level job. Consequently, entrant workers have lower job-finding rates and longer unemployment durations than the unemployed who have looked for a job in the past. To study the welfare implications of these observations, we consider a version of the DMP model where firms who match with entrant workers have to incur training costs. As a result, firms are biased against entrant workers, who, in turn, stay unemployed for a prolonged period of time, exposing themselves to a persistent skill loss shock. We use a calibrated version of the model to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of four government interventions whose common goal is to reduce bias against entrant workers. We find that the most effective intervention takes the form of a subsidy that induces firms to rank entrants higher than experienced workers and that this policy brings the economy very close to the constrained efficient outcome.