The capital market consequences of the regulator-led minority shareholder: Evidence from China

Abstract

We examine the capital market consequences of the exercise of rights by the regulatory minority shareholder. Using a manually collected sample from the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), a novel regulatory investor protection institution controlled by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, we employ a stacked difference-in-differences model in our main regression analysis to estimate the impact of the CSISC’s actions. We find that the CSISC’s exercise of rights has a risk signaling effect, increasing perceived risk among investors, which is reflected in reduced stock liquidity and an increased cost of equity. Event studies indicate negative market reactions to actions taken by the CSISC against targeted firms. Additional analyses show that a negative tone and increased investor attention toward the CSISC’s actions further amplify the market responses. Cross-sectional analyses reveal a stronger effect for firms with regulatory alliances, while effective internal governance mitigates this effect. Collectively, our study highlights the market consequences of the regulator-led minority shareholder’s interventions in an emerging market that lacks strong private enforcement.