{"title":"Contracting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Between Nonrivals in Competitive Industry Equilibrium","authors":"Travis Ng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4536","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a duopoly model, one firm has the option to collaborate in R&D with a third party. Although collaboration can expedite innovation, the third party may unintentionally leak the innovation to the rival firm. Engaging in R&D collaboration can make the rival firm anticipate a free ride, which weakens its incentives for R&D spending. The firm can take legal action against the third party in case of information leakage. Strengthening contracting institutions improves the likelihood of success in such cases. In a competitive industry equilibrium, strengthening contracting institutions only sometimes increases R&D collaboration, industry R&D spending, and the innovation rate.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":"46 6","pages":"3414-3427"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4536","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Managerial and Decision Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4536","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In a duopoly model, one firm has the option to collaborate in R&D with a third party. Although collaboration can expedite innovation, the third party may unintentionally leak the innovation to the rival firm. Engaging in R&D collaboration can make the rival firm anticipate a free ride, which weakens its incentives for R&D spending. The firm can take legal action against the third party in case of information leakage. Strengthening contracting institutions improves the likelihood of success in such cases. In a competitive industry equilibrium, strengthening contracting institutions only sometimes increases R&D collaboration, industry R&D spending, and the innovation rate.
期刊介绍:
Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.