Cooperation creates moral obligations

IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Alexander W. Cappelen , Varun Gauri , Bertil Tungodden
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In a large-scale economic experiment, conducted with a general population sample from the United States, we show that cooperation is seen to create relationship-specific moral obligations among those who cooperate. Participants in the experiment, acting as third party spectators, transfer significantly more money from a lucky to an unlucky worker when the two workers have cooperated with each other than when they have worked independently. In contrast, cooperation is not seen to make the unlucky worker more deserving of help from workers they have not cooperated with. The effect of cooperation is strongly associated with political affiliation: Republicans attach significantly less importance to cooperation as a source of moral obligations than non-Republicans. The findings shed light on the foundations of redistributive preferences and may help explain the difference in the willingness to help in-group members and out-group members.
合作产生道德义务
在一项以美国普通人群为样本进行的大规模经济实验中,我们表明,合作被视为在合作的人之间创造了特定于关系的道德义务。实验的参与者作为第三方旁观者,当一个幸运的工人与另一个不幸的工人合作时,他们转移给他们的钱明显多于他们独立工作时的钱。相比之下,合作并没有使不幸的工人更值得他们没有合作的工人的帮助。合作的效果与政治立场密切相关:共和党人明显比非共和党人更不重视合作作为道德义务的来源。这些发现揭示了再分配偏好的基础,并可能有助于解释帮助群体内成员和群体外成员意愿的差异。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
9.10%
发文量
392
期刊介绍: The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.
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