How to ensure streamers tell the Truth? Compensation design for E-commerce streamers

IF 11 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Lu Xiao , Xinyue Yang , Jun Wang
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Abstract

To address the moral hazard stemming from exaggerated product claims by streamers in live e-commerce, this study proposes a rational compensation mechanism aimed at incentivizing and guiding streamer behavior. The analytical framework integrates product return volume as a key parameter and employs mathematical modeling to systematically explore the dynamic interactions between two principal market participants: the company (as the employer) and the streamer. The model evaluates consumer purchasing decisions, company profitability, and streamer utility under two contrasting scenarios—exaggerated versus truthful product descriptions—and identifies the conditions under which streamers promoting low-quality products are incentivized to report product quality truthfully. Satisfying these conditions encourages streamers to prioritize honest communication. The findings demonstrate that for both experience goods and credence goods, a commission structure linked to product return volume can enhance sales effort—particularly when such effort effectively reduces return volume. Both sales-based and return-based commission schemes significantly influence streamer behavior during live streaming. Crucially, when the ratio of return-based to sales-based commissions falls below a certain threshold, streamers working with low-quality firms are more likely to provide truthful product information. These results offer theoretical guidance for firms to refine their streamer compensation strategies, promoting greater transparency and more sustainable practices in the live e-commerce ecosystem.
如何确保主播讲真话?电子商务流媒体补偿设计
针对电商直播中主播夸大产品宣传所带来的道德风险,本研究提出了一种合理的补偿机制,旨在激励和引导主播行为。分析框架将产品回收量作为关键参数,并采用数学模型系统地探索两个主要市场参与者:公司(作为雇主)和流通者之间的动态互动。该模型在两种不同的情况下评估消费者的购买决策、公司的盈利能力和流媒体的效用——夸大的产品描述和真实的产品描述——并确定在哪种情况下,流媒体推广低质量的产品会被激励如实报告产品质量。满足这些条件会鼓励主播优先考虑诚实的沟通。研究结果表明,对于体验商品和信用商品,佣金结构与产品退货量相关联可以提高销售努力,特别是当这种努力有效地减少退货量时。基于销售和基于回报的佣金方案都显著影响直播期间的流媒体行为。至关重要的是,当基于回报的佣金与基于销售的佣金的比率低于某一阈值时,与低质量公司合作的主播更有可能提供真实的产品信息。这些结果为企业完善其主播薪酬策略提供了理论指导,促进了现场电子商务生态系统中更大的透明度和更可持续的实践。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
20.40
自引率
14.40%
发文量
340
审稿时长
20 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services is a prominent publication that serves as a platform for international and interdisciplinary research and discussions in the constantly evolving fields of retailing and services studies. With a specific emphasis on consumer behavior and policy and managerial decisions, the journal aims to foster contributions from academics encompassing diverse disciplines. The primary areas covered by the journal are: Retailing and the sale of goods The provision of consumer services, including transportation, tourism, and leisure.
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