Inverse option generation: Inferences about others' values based on what comes to mind

Abstract

Prior research shows that when people try to think of things, such as solutions to a problem, the options that come to mind most often are those that they consider statistically common and valuable. Here, we ask whether ordinary people anticipate this and, therefore, infer that when uncommon solutions come to someone's mind, it is diagnostic of how much those solutions are represented as valuable—including in the moral domain. To illustrate, imagine your friend is brainstorming what to serve a vegetarian couple and says aloud, “maybe pizza, salad, or penne alfredo?” While some of the options can be explained by both their value and statistical frequency (e.g., pizza or salad), you might infer that only your friend's particular affection for penne alfredo explains why that option came to mind. Across four studies we demonstrate inferences of this kind, and our results suggest that participants are able to make such inferences by inverting their intuitive understanding of the option-generation process itself. Whereas many current models of our folk theory of mind focus on the core mechanics of deliberative choice – such as the use of beliefs and desires to plan rational action – our results show a much broader folk understanding of pre-deliberative aspects of thought, such as the very process of option generation.