Turning Vulnerability Into Strength: How Independent Regulatory Agencies Enhance Accountability and Build Stakeholder Trust

IF 3.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Jacint Jordana, Juan Carlos Triviño‐Salazar
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Trustable environments are highly appreciated for regulatory performance, but difficult to emerge. A condition for making trust work is to accept vulnerability, and this holds both for stakeholders and agencies in public governance. Trust‐related vulnerability can be understood as a dynamic perception of potential harm derived from entering into a desired interaction. While stakeholders increased vulnerability due to voluntary exchanges with public bodies has been widely documented, the conditions under which agencies voluntarily increase their vulnerability remain less explored. Focusing on independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), this paper introduces a conceptual framework where agency vulnerability serves as a strategic tool to enhance IRAs' accountability, ultimately supporting these goals. We argue that IRAs intentionally incorporate vulnerability to make accountability efforts more credible, fostering stakeholder trust and facilitating operations. To achieve this, IRAs disclose sensitive information through accountability mechanisms, including transparency and participation initiatives. While this exposes them to criticism, penalization, or termination, it also strengthens stakeholder support and regulatory effectiveness. However, to manage risks, vulnerability is often selectively applied, prioritizing preferred stakeholders. We empirically apply this framework on Spanish data protection, finance, and food safety regulators. Our findings suggest that while vulnerability increases risks by enabling potential harm to IRAs, it ultimately mitigates accountability challenges and enhances trust among selected stakeholders, making accountability relationships more credible.
化脆弱性为优势:独立监管机构如何加强问责制并建立利益相关者信任
可信赖的环境在监管绩效方面受到高度赞赏,但很难出现。信任发挥作用的一个条件是接受脆弱性,这对公共治理中的利益相关者和机构都适用。信任相关的脆弱性可以被理解为一种动态感知,即进入一种期望的互动过程中产生的潜在伤害。虽然利益相关者由于与公共机构的自愿交换而增加脆弱性已被广泛记录,但机构自愿增加其脆弱性的条件仍未得到探索。本文以独立监管机构(IRAs)为重点,介绍了一个概念框架,其中机构脆弱性作为加强IRAs问责制的战略工具,最终支持这些目标。我们认为,ira有意将脆弱性纳入其中,以使问责工作更加可信,促进利益相关者的信任并促进运营。为了实现这一目标,ira通过问责机制披露敏感信息,包括透明度和参与倡议。虽然这会使他们面临批评、惩罚或解雇,但它也加强了利益相关者的支持和监管有效性。然而,为了管理风险,脆弱性经常被选择性地应用,优先考虑优先考虑的利益相关者。我们经验性地将此框架应用于西班牙数据保护、金融和食品安全监管机构。我们的研究结果表明,虽然脆弱性通过对ira造成潜在伤害而增加了风险,但它最终减轻了问责挑战,增强了选定利益相关者之间的信任,使问责关系更加可信。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
10.00%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: Regulation & Governance serves as the leading platform for the study of regulation and governance by political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, historians, criminologists, psychologists, anthropologists, economists and others. Research on regulation and governance, once fragmented across various disciplines and subject areas, has emerged at the cutting edge of paradigmatic change in the social sciences. Through the peer-reviewed journal Regulation & Governance, we seek to advance discussions between various disciplines about regulation and governance, promote the development of new theoretical and empirical understanding, and serve the growing needs of practitioners for a useful academic reference.
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