Multi-Period operations optimization for passenger-freight shared transport: A game-theoretic approach

Abstract

In the context of the sharing economy, passenger-freight shared transport emerges as an effective measure to enhance the utilization efficiency of transportation resources by leveraging excess bus capacity for freight transportation. This study considers a scenario where the intercity bus company (BC) can utilize its surplus capacity to transport freight for the logistics company (LC). We first characterize the interaction between their decisions using a sequential game model. Then, by employing a backward induction approach, we derive the optimal operational decisions for both the LC and BC for a given freight volume. Furthermore, we develop a multi-period optimization model to determine system-optimal freight volume allocation scheme for the LC and propose a tailored algorithm that yields near-optimal solutions. Additionally, we extend the basic model to investigate the impact of freight transport pricing authority on various stakeholders and evaluate the performance of different shared transport models. The results suggest that passenger-freight shared transport generally facilitates a win–win outcome between the LC and BC while reducing bus passenger waiting times. Additionally, multi-period coordinated decision-making contributes to enhancing overall system efficiency. Furthermore, when freight pricing is determined by the BC, it leads to higher freight volumes and more frequent bus departures, but may also result in increased ticket prices for passengers.