Optimizing channel selection and contract decision of low-carbon supply chain under government subsidy

Abstract

Applied model research is an important approach to low-carbon supply chain optimization, and the key of model optimization is the game and contract selection among the participants. Based on the above background, the two-stage Stackelberg game model is used to provide decision-making advice for the government’s low-carbon subsidy policy, the low-carbon development direction of supply chain members and the contract selection among supply chain members, explore an optimal low-carbon supply chain channel and contract form. Firstly, for common supply chain systems, a single-channel subsidy decision model (Model S), a closed-loop channel subsidy decision model (model C) and a dual-channel subsidy decision model (model D) are constructed. Secondly, through numerical analysis, the optimal supply chain channel structure that can make full use of government subsidies is defined. Finally, based on the optimal supply chain system, the benefit sharing contract (DRS) and cost sharing contract (DCS) are constructed, and the contract forms that can realize the Pareto improvement of supply chain system are discussed. The results show that: (1) When different subsidy policies are adopted, the performance of the three models in terms of overall supply chain profit is as follows: Model D > Model C > Model S. (2) When the government subsidy rate is high, the contract DCS completes the Pareto improvement of the wholesale price contract in model D. (3) In contract DCS, the optimal subsidy rate and the optimal cost-sharing coefficient are inversely proportional to the demand transfer coefficient and the level of consumer environmental awareness.