Political connections of executives and directors: Relevant facts to understand the impact of politicians on firm valuation

IF 3.1 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Andrés Fernando Mejía-Amaya , Carlos Pombo
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of political connections on firm valuation across large, listed corporations in emerging markets in the Americas. The study analyzes the impact of a higher number of politically connected individuals, their role as officers or directors, and the impact of tenure on firm market value. Our estimations show the positive impact of being a politically connected firm. Moreover, the strongly positive impact of politically connected directors is different from the weaker effect of politically connected officers. The intensity of politically connected directors positively impacts on firm valuation. There is a moderating role of tenure, that implies the positive beginning impact of politically connected directors on firm value decreases over time.
高管和董事的政治关系:了解政治家对公司估值影响的相关事实
本文考察了政治关系对美洲新兴市场大型上市公司估值的影响。该研究分析了更多政治关系个人的影响,他们作为官员或董事的角色,以及任期对公司市场价值的影响。我们的估计显示了具有政治关系的公司的积极影响。此外,有政治关系的董事具有较强的积极影响,而有政治关系的官员具有较弱的积极影响。政治关联董事的强度对公司估值有正向影响。任期具有调节作用,这意味着有政治关系的董事对公司价值的积极初始影响随着时间的推移而降低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
2.90%
发文量
118
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (QREF) attracts and publishes high quality manuscripts that cover topics in the areas of economics, financial economics and finance. The subject matter may be theoretical, empirical or policy related. Emphasis is placed on quality, originality, clear arguments, persuasive evidence, intelligent analysis and clear writing. At least one Special Issue is published per year. These issues have guest editors, are devoted to a single theme and the papers have well known authors. In addition we pride ourselves in being able to provide three to four article "Focus" sections in most of our issues.
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