Are Resident Terrorist Groups Productive in Weak States?

Abstract

The current study shows that terrorist groups residing in weak states generate more domestic, transnational, and total terrorist attacks than their counterparts based in relatively stable countries during 1970–2016. At the group-year unit of analysis, the superior attack productivity of weak state terrorist groups is robust to alternative empirical specifications that include four different weak state metrics—territorial control losses, tax revenue challenge, bureaucratic weakness, and violence vulnerabilities. In addition, we find that terrorist groups in weak states are much more inclined to engage in kidnappings, which exploit state weakness, compared to their counterparts elsewhere. To bolster causal inference, we apply an instrument to account for potential endogeneity of state weakness when weakness concerns a lack of territorial control. The analysis herein indicates that weak states' terrorist groups pose a formidable risk not only at home but also abroad. Our comprehensive use of alternative measures of state weakness helps to settle the debate on how state weakness influences terrorism. By focusing on resident terrorist groups, our study links state weakness to the strategic behavior of such groups rather than merely illustrating how the state's wider environmental considerations affect terrorism.