The Rules-Based International Order Under Siege

Abstract

The rules-based international order (RBIO), a by-product of post-World War II multilateralism and post-Cold War liberal triumphalism, is now experiencing its most severe stress test since its inception. The global normative framework that once fostered free trade, peace, stability, and international cooperation has been steadily eroded by revisionist states and now further weakened by the return of Donald Trump to the White House. Trump 2.0 has already begun to realign US foreign policy away from liberal internationalism and toward a more unilateral, transactional, and sovereignty-centered approach. In Asia, the implications are far-reaching, as regional actors recalibrate their strategic positions in response to both an increasingly contested RBIO and a disruptive United States.

However, Asian states are not passively observing the RBIO's decay but are actively navigating its transformation—some by defending its core principles, others by subtly revising it, and many by hedging, adapting, or accommodating based on shifting power realities. The result is a contested and pluralized regional order, where liberal norms coexist uneasily with realist calculations and authoritarian tendencies.

The People's Republic of China continues to lead the charge against the universality of the liberal international order. While Beijing remains rhetorically committed to international law and multilateral institutions, its actions reveal a preference for a hierarchical, sovereignty-centered, and Sinocentric order. In the maritime domain, China has ignored the 2016 Arbitral Award in favor of the Philippines and continues aggressive expansionism in the South China Sea. In the technological and economic arenas, it promotes decoupled, state-dominated ecosystems that challenge open markets and regulatory transparency.

Russia, although geographically peripheral to the Indo-Pacific, plays a supportive role in this revisionist axis. The ongoing war in Ukraine and Russia's deepening strategic alignment with China signal a broader ideological defiance of the West-led order. Their growing coordination—including joint military exercises in East Asia—adds to regional anxiety about a possible “authoritarian entente” that undermines democratic norms and international law.

Compounding these challenges is the current posture of the United States under President Donald Trump. Trump's return to power has reintroduced a foreign policy style marked by isolationism, transactionalism, and a deep skepticism toward traditional allies and multilateral institutions. His administration has already begun scaling back commitments to NATO, de-emphasizing democratic promotion abroad, and signaling discomfort with long-standing security arrangements in Asia.

In the Indo-Pacific, Trump 2.0 has led to renewed uncertainty over US extended deterrence, especially regarding North Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. His administration's growing focus on bilateral deals over regional partnerships has strained collective frameworks such as the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Meanwhile, Trump's open admiration for strongman leaders and disregard for democratic norms embolden illiberal regimes and weaken the global standing of liberal democracy.

Asian states have long relied on the United States as a stabilizer of the regional balance of power and a backstop against Chinese hegemony. Yet Trump's erratic diplomacy and disregard for alliances force regional actors to reconsider their dependency on American leadership. The vacuum created by this ambivalence does not necessarily lead to China's dominance—but it does invite greater hedging, fragmentation, and norm fluidity.

Amid these shifts, some Asian democracies remain firm in defending the RBIO. Japan continues to be a leading voice for international rule of law, maritime freedom, and multilateral cooperation. Prime Minister Kishida has deepened Japan's regional engagements, expanded security cooperation with Southeast Asia, and invested in economic frameworks that preserve liberal trade norms.

South Korea, despite its complex relationship with both the United States and China, remains normatively aligned with the RBIO. Under President Yoon, Seoul has strengthened ties with Washington while cautiously increasing trilateral cooperation with Tokyo—signaling a strategic recognition of the importance of rules-based governance in countering both North Korean threats and regional instability (Ban 2020).

Most Southeast Asian states, however, neither revise nor explicitly defend the RBIO. Instead, they engage in strategic adjustment—pursuing autonomy, diversifying partnerships, and maintaining a delicate balancing act between major powers. ASEAN's consensus-based diplomacy reflects the region's preference for ambiguity, non-alignment, and gradualism.

The Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos Jr. offers a telling example. Manila has reasserted its alliance with Washington by expanding EDCA sites and increasing joint military exercises. Yet it also maintains economic ties with China and steers clear of confrontational rhetoric. While the Philippine government invokes international law in the West Philippine Sea, it remains cautious about binding itself too firmly to any one bloc, wary of Trump's unpredictability and the specter of abandonment (Ibarra 2024).

Indonesia exemplifies regional ambivalence. Jakarta champions ASEAN centrality and maritime cooperation but is reluctant to choose sides. Its strategic culture emphasizes sovereignty, non-alignment, and economic diplomacy, which makes it resistant to any binary framing of US–China rivalry. Vietnam similarly balances assertiveness in defending its sovereignty against China with strategic pragmatism and ideological solidarity within the communist world (Yoshimatsu 2022).

The RBIO in Asia is not collapsing, but it is mutating. Trump's return has accelerated the erosion of liberal hegemony but has not eliminated the need for rules, norms, and institutions. Instead, what is emerging is a pluralist and hybrid regional order—one that blends elements of liberalism, realism, and regional exceptionalism.

Middle powers and regional actors still have agency. They can shape new minilateral arrangements, defend maritime entitlements through international law, and selectively engage institutions that preserve open markets and strategic stability. The CPTPP, IPEF (albeit weakened), and ASEAN-led mechanisms remain crucial venues for this reconstitution (Yeo and Chung 2023).

For Southeast Asia, the imperative is to build resilience—not by picking sides, but by investing in institutional capacity, enhancing maritime awareness, and asserting sovereignty through legal and diplomatic means. Democratic consolidation must also remain a priority, lest the region slide into the orbit of authoritarian revisionism.

For this issue of APP, we have three papers on environmental politics and policy which is a continuation of our last issue together with research articles on Chinese politics, Philippine foreign policy, cross-strait relations, and two papers discussing ASEAN's Indo-Pacific approach. We also have policy papers about artificial intelligence in North Korea and China-Mercosur Relations. We hope our readers will find great interest in our latest issue.