{"title":"Guiding Examples: Democratic Myth-Making in the Work of María Zambrano","authors":"Karolina Enquist Källgren","doi":"10.1111/1467-8675.12782","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Against the background of growing populist and authoritarian movements in the United Staes, Europe, India, and Russia, political myths and their use have become a topic of theoretical contention (Bauman <span>2017a, 2017b</span>; Reich <span>2015</span>). Some authors have argued that political myths—for example, narratives of rise and decline or of origins—are a populist tool foreign to the principles of rational liberal democracies (Abizadeh, <span>2004</span>; Eatwell and Goddwin <span>2018</span>; Green <span>2014</span>, 119–130; Müller <span>2016</span>). But the more radically political myths are positioned in opposition to the good governance of liberal democracy, the more difficult it becomes to explain the resurgence of populism in contemporary politics. An alternative opinion maintains that myths are in fact a necessary part of identity-building. Whether in the context of nation-building and the establishment of strong identities (Hosking and Schöpflin <span>1997</span>) or as a significant basis for radical forms of social self-assertion (Bottici <span>2009</span>; Errejón and Mouffe <span>2015</span>), myths play a fundamental role. Yet, if myth is pervasive and will not cease to exist independently of rational attempts at debunking it, the question of how to evaluate myth becomes all the more important. How is it possible to distinguish between myths that are detrimental to democratic institutions, procedures, and values, and myths that encourage democratic forms of participation, subjectivity, and political action, and that strengthen values like equality and justice?</p><p>In this article, I seek to combine interpretive and conceptual perspectives in 20th century history in order to propose a normative analysis of political myths. In particular, I argue that in our recent history, there have been two different models of myth-making: fascist myths, on the one hand, and the more recent development of populist myths, on the other. One important distinguishing feature is the way in which these two models organize emotions.</p><p>In the following, I will first define political myths as a historical phenomenon and then introduce the concept of <i>emotional analogy</i> to distinguish fascist from populist leader myths. With the help of the Spanish philosopher María Zambrano (1904–1991), I will further use this analysis to develop a third, democratic model of myth-making. I suggest to use this model as a heuristic to guide democratic practices in creatively criticizing and (re)working political myths today.</p><p>As Martha Nussbaum rightly maintained, myth-making is part and parcel of democracy because like any other form of government, democracy relies on emotions that keep it alive (Nussbaum <span>2013</span>). In a time where myths are being weaponized for authoritarian politics, democratic societies need to harness democratic myths that are capable of organizing and strengthening a democratic emotional core. If such myths are to be effective, political theorists have to study the historically specific ways in which myths have mobilized and channeled emotions for different purposes. Zambrano's discussion is particularly helpful in this respect because it acutely delineates fascist myth-making and insists on democratic alternatives. Furthermore, her work can be seen as an ongoing philosophical and literary actualization of mythical tropes that she reinterpreted in order to safeguard and promote democratic values in the face of fascism. She called those tropes “guides” and employed them with much practical insight to account for the emotional growth, regulative ideals, and political subjectivity that she identified with democratic political change.</p><p>Zambrano fought on the side of the Republic in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), and witnessed the growth of national Catholicism and fascism in Spain. When Franco won the war, she went into exile in various parts of Latin America and Europe and did not return to Spain until 1986, where she remained until her death in 1991. It was against the lived experience of exile and totalitarianism that Zambrano proposed guides as a tool to promote democratic values and political practices. She began writing on myths at a time when fascists and Nazis dominated the public space through the mythic leader-gestalt: <i>der Führer-Mythos</i> (Kershaw, <span>1980</span>). In Spain, Franco similarly styled himself as “El Caudillo,” and in Italy Mussolini became “Il duce”—titles that carried connotations of their bearers’ mythological and quasi-religious connection with the people. Beneath the emotional and violent onslaught of fascist mythical narratives, Zambrano's “guides” can be seen as an attempt to create democratic myths that could contribute to the survival of democratic ideals and democratic political subjects.</p><p>Political myths are narratives that combine elements from a concrete or imagined past and actualizes them in a symbolically significant manner in the present (Fulbrook <span>1997</span>, 73). As such, they contain ideas about a future society or ideals that are to be realized in the future. Sacred myths turn into political myths once they are strategically applied to achieve political goals and, therefore, carry, promote, and represent ideological elements (Flood <span>2013</span>, 41–43). Myths are furthermore often distinguished in the literature from ideology, where the latter is defined as a system of rational and coherent arguments. Myths are distinguished by their narrative and symbolical structures as well as the fact that they operate with an emotional logic (McGuire <span>1987</span>). However, in actual politics, myths often go hand in hand with ideological arguments, sustaining arguments with dramatic representation or as substitution of gaps in the argument with emotional value (Flood <span>2013</span>, 115–125). Political myths are furthermore narratives that rely on symbolism and its immediate recognition by the receiver. Their strong symbolizing power forms part of our lived experience of the present, as something we adhere to consciously or as an immediate and “banal” part of everyday experiences (Bottici <span>2009</span>, 246). National monuments and ideas about national character are typical elements of political myth in everyday life.</p><p>The recognition of mythical elements is “banal” because they are historically inherited through a process similar to what Ernst Cassirer called “symbolic pregnance.” According to Cassirer, in everyday life, we combine elements into larger groups based on inherited rules of combination. Myth is one such set of rules, and symbolical pregnance denotes the inherited meanings by which an individual combines new perceptions (Cassirer <span>1955b</span>, 191–204). For Cassirer, myth is a symbolic form that integrates perception, emotions, will, and knowledge. Bottici suggests something similar when she discusses the “condensational capacity” of political myths (<span>2009</span>, 252). And Blumenberg speaks of the relation between the elements of myth and their inherited meaning as “iconic consistency” and notes that this is what makes a myth symbolically powerful and culturally significant (<span>1990</span>, 150). Due to symbolic pregnancy and iconic consistency, myths may give the impression of conveying unhistorical universal features (Barthes <span>1972</span>, 142, 151; Munz <span>1956</span>, 1–16). However, each element of a particular myth is imbued with meaning from previous historical renderings, which are actualized in the present as rules for perception. Political myths gain universality as a particular form of experience precisely because they have a history.</p><p>In this sense, myths order the contents of our experiences through what could be described as an emotional logic. Cassirer argued that it is characteristic of myths to order perceptions in such a way as to represent all things as ontologically equal and interchangeable. Myths order lived experiences through emotions and desires, rather than reason, influencing elements of human perception so that similar things come to be processed as identical (Cassirer <span>1955a</span>, 67–69). Cassirer saw myths as determined by their own inner logic. But since he believed that myths would eventually be superseded by reason, he failed to see that myths <i>interact</i> with reason in order to produce symbolic power. And while his view of myths contains historical aspects—for example, the way in which symbolic pregnance established rules through history—the emphasis on myth as a form of experience tended to universalize its ordering function. In particular, Cassirer's analysis did not pay closer attention to the ways in which the ordering function of political myths changes through history. As a result, the idea of democratic myth-making could not make sense to him.</p><p>Expanding on aspects of Cassirer's argument, I understand political myths as an emotional order of experience that functions by way of what I describe as <i>emotional analogy</i>, which structures experience by emotionally grouping together things that are not in fact the same. It is through emotional analogy that political myths render similar and interchangeable what is at the same time recognized as rationally distinct. Emotional analogy is a work with emotions taking place through myth-making in some cases where two elements have previously been recognized as rationally distinct through an exercise of reason. Emotions as well as reason interact with each other in political myths. Furthermore, I argue that the way in which emotional analogies connect what is rationally distinct changes over time, that is, emotional analogy ties myth to reason in historically specific ways.</p><p>María Zambrano, an author relatively unknown in the English-speaking world, focused her philosophical project on countering fascist myth-making. Before discussing the three dimensions of democratic myth-making, it is important to contextualize Zambrano's discussion of myth within her larger philosophical framework. Her writings, spanning from before the Spanish Civil War and World War II (1936–1945) until the 1960s, can be seen as a study of myths that aimed to challenge what she perceived as the “idolatrous constitution” of European societies (Zambrano, 2011, 405).</p><p>Zambrano's use of myths and narratives to counteract fascism was rooted in the belief that human life constantly needed to reinvent itself through work and expression, guided by the principle of truths (2011a, 475). According to Zambrano, the initial reaction of a human being to their surroundings is to create histories, symbols, and lies to legitimize their desires. She believed that the act of perceiving is always an interested narrative, reflecting an engaged encounter with the world that encompasses both reason and emotion (2011c, 1011–1012). Much like Cassirer, Zambrano believed that experience always occurs in a form which has developed as an expression of desire and will in the human being. But unlike Cassirer, she did not believe that reason was any less an expression of desire and will than, for example, myth. Reason and myth were different forms of human expression.</p><p>Human expression was furthermore determined by what Zambrano called necessity: a term that connected individual experiences with material conditions. Necessity was the actual material conditions of a given situation, the circumstances in which individuals expressed themselves. But the circumstances were corresponded by the necessary individual conviction of how to act to answer to those circumstances. Zambrano called such actions labor and argued that conviction on the appropriate actions in a particular situation was connected to the values or ideals that guided activity (Zambrano <span>2015a</span>, 271). In <i>El sueño creador</i> (The creative dream, 1986, written in the 1960s), Zambrano wrote that truth appears to us as an insinuated final goal, as a horizon, or as a reason to continue moving forward (2011c, 1013). The truth or ideals that function as goals could never be fully known, and they were always intuited and directed human actions like an aim that could not be fully envisioned. Zambrano equated truth with “the autonomy of one own's being” (<i>autonomía del propio ser</i>, <span>2011c</span>, 1043), taking autonomy as the possibility to act for change. The inability to fully realize ideals was what made autonomous action possible, and autonomy was a goal realized by attempts to actualize other ideals. In sum, human life was the expressive product of the necessary reactions and actions in front of the material circumstances; a labor that was guided by as of yet unfulfilled ideals and values.</p><p>It is noteworthy that laboring toward autonomy was foundational to defining individuality, as well as enabling the formation of political subjects. In her work <i>Los intelectuales en el drama de España</i>, Zambrano utilizes the concept of “<i>el pueblo</i>” to represent the collective resistance against the Franco uprising. Although her language may seem populist, she characterizes the people as those inherently linked to the state or as the “new man” (Zambrano <span>2015a</span>, 150, 170). It is important to contextualize this concept within the book, a compilation of writings from the Spanish Civil War, where “the people” she mentions specifically came together—irrespective of party affiliations—to safeguard the Second Republic from the revolutionary fascist forces. The people acted as the political subject who defended the democratically elected government from a revolutionary fascism that made use of a concept of people rooted in blood and faith. Upholding her belief that democracy went hand in hand with the autonomy of political subjects who could affect change in their circumstances, she argued for the role of poetry and culture in order to mobilize people capable of withstanding Franco fascism and its foreign supporters in Germany and Italy (Zambrano <span>2015a</span>, 179–194). Additionally, she refuted definitions of the people who equaled it to the masses, a collective of individuals or the commoners (Zambrano <span>2015a</span>, 124). The concept of “the new man” represented a unified group with diverse political agendas but a shared commitment to safeguarding democracy, state integrity, and equality. This interpretation aligns with her subsequent definitions of democracy, totalitarianism, and fascism later in her life.</p><p>Zambrano characterized a democratic society as consistent with two fundamental beliefs: the possibility and historical necessity of changing material circumstances, and the inclusivity of practical and idea-formulating work for change across all parts of society (<span>2011a</span>, 500–501). She argued that all mythical narratives, including fascism, corresponded to the human need to be guided by values and ideals (Zambrano 2011b, 195-198). However, totalitarianism, encompassing both fascism and Nazism, grew strong due to a lack of alternative guiding ideals and values (<span>2011a</span>, 442). Her analysis of totalitarianism, together with her general view of the human being as expressive, was determining for her ideas on democratic myth-making. Totalitarianism established a mythical narrative with an absolute goal, such as the messianic <i>Third Reich</i> in Germany or the Catholic state in Spain, without recognizing the ongoing search for truth through reinvention and self-expression. Fascist myths were used as a tool to present the masses with an already given truth, underpinned by violence as a means of realizing that truth, and it intended to create a time-less reign in which every possible action was contained in the agency of the omnipresent leader (Zambrano <span>2011a</span>, 442). It did not permit the people to change their own conditions (Zambrano <span>2015a</span>, 124). It left no room for continuous expression or communal exploration of appropriate actions in a given circumstance. Instead, it enforced emotional exaltation, finality, and inevitability, excluding individuals from the continuous expressive search for truth that is fundamental to human life (Zambrano <span>2011a</span>, 430–431).</p><p>In <i>Persona y democracia</i> (Person and democracy, 1958), Zambrano argued that the Nazi regime's rise to power was rooted in the suppressed feelings of various minority groups who felt powerless to act in their social circumstances Zambrano 2011b, 391-392, 404, 426). As a result, they placed their agency in the hands of a leader who assumed the role of a divine idol and was worshipped as all-powerful. However, this idolatry came at a cost, as all idols require sacrifices. The stronger the connection between the idol and society, the more victims it demanded (406–408). Zambrano observed that the complete exaltation of an individual could only be achieved through the total transgression of the law. Collaborators who expressed adoration did so because they believed that by disregarding all laws and rationality, they could act and create from nothing, as if they were gods themselves (427–428). This belief was closely tied to intense emotions. Fascism was characterized by passionate and radical voluntarism, where the collective will was embodied by the leader (439).</p><p>In conclusion, Zambrano highlighted how the aspiration to become gods posed a constant threat in societies where material circumstances and the need for change were not met with sound-guiding principles (Zambrano <span>2011a</span>). While myths and utopic dreams could easily lead to the historical crimes committed by fascism, they were also necessary for formulating narratives that guided individuals toward the realization of autonomy and truth (1043). Zambrano emphasized the importance of literature and drama in countering the spread of fascist culture and social norms (<span>2016b</span>, 483). She believed that democratic ideas should be presented in a narrative style that could have transformative effects.</p><p>Zambrano's understanding of human life as fundamentally an expressive search for truth led her to identify the need for mythic practices that entailed emotional transformation toward feelings of reflective conviction and perseveration in acting for change. The two interconnected ideas will be discussed in the following as the dimensions of emotional transformation and of regulative ideals. Both allowed her to conceptualize the process through which such emotional transformation could occur: a process that centered on what she called “the guide.” While Zambrano primarily focused on how individuals could act to uphold values and emotional conviction, her discussion also provides insights into how democratic myth-making can shape political subjects capable of change, which I refer to as the dimension of political subjectivity.</p><p>In the previous sections, I have outlined a model for democratic myth-making that enables the distinction between democratic myths and other historical models of myth-making, such as the fascist myth and the contemporary populist myth. One crucial way to differentiate between them is the manner in which they organize emotions through emotional analogy and the emotional value they confer to different ideals and contents. Fascist myths employed an emotional analogy that allowed the leader to embody ideals as absolute, even as those ideals changed over time. In contrast, myths function differently in neoliberal societies, where our emotions are heavily influenced by individual consumption choices. Populist myths utilize an emotional analogy that bestows emotional value to the structure of ironic interchangeability.</p><p>Democratic myth-making can serve as an aesthetic tool for emotional organization around goals and the conviction of the necessity to act in situations where we face complex political and economic challenges with no easy answers, and where the outcomes of politics have life-changing consequences. That is achieved through a process of reflection and emotional transformation. Democratic myths employ an emotional analogy that connects actions to regulative ideals, imbuing certain actions with emotional value as if they can produce the desired outcomes, even in seemingly impossible situations where change appears difficult to achieve.</p><p>Ultimately, democratic myth-making contributes to the formation of a subject who recognizes the need for personal transformation through the experiences of others. It fosters solidarity in the face of mutual life-threatening problems, transcending personal or group differences. Democratic myths achieve this by enticing individuals to emotionally invest in regulative ideals that require continuous deliberation and by facilitating emotional identification with the example of someone whose circumstances are not exactly the same. This emotional solidarity may appear fragile in a contemporary context dominated by populist myths and the neoliberal market economy, which tend to individualize needs and desires. However, emotionally convinced and reflected solidarity is a crucial means of overcoming individualism without resorting to embodied identification. Democratic myth-making serves as a political tool for the ongoing work of cultivating such solidarity.</p><p>Zambrano formulated her concept of the guide during a specific era, facing particular challenges to democracy. As with political myths in general, the process of democratic myth-making requires adaptation to the historical context. Zambrano drew inspiration from Greek tragedy to illustrate her points, a choice aligned with the prevailing educational and cultural norms of her time. The example of Antigone, in particular, resonated with Zambrano's own sense of having failed to safeguard democracy. Antigone's selfless sacrifice for higher ideals mirrored Zambrano's personal ordeal of exile, symbolizing a hope for future realization of such values. It is acknowledged that in contemporary society, Antigone may not hold the same sway as a guiding exemplar, indicating the necessity for diverse democratic myths to counter different contemporary challenges. The model of democratic myth-making proposed here should not be regarded as an exhaustive representation, but rather as a tool for recognizing pertinent figures, images, and dilemmas that could effectively contribute to the formulation of democratic myths in the present day.</p><p>In contemporary Brazil, two generals refused to obey Bolsonaro's order to stage a coup when he, as outgoing president, was faced with the requirement to hand over power after elections. They could serve as valuable exemplars for democratic myth-making. Faced with the dilemma of following commands that defined their positions or to uphold democratic principles, they opted for the latter, risking being labeled as enemies of an illegitimate government had the coup succeeded. Similarly, in the United States, election workers in 2020 declined to partake in the vote recount or cast doubts on the election results, choosing to act in defense of democratic processes over party loyalties despite encountering pressure, threats, and defamation. Drawing on these individuals can aid in the crafting of a democratic myth designed to evoke emotional change and foster solidarity in the defense of democratic institutions. While other threats to democracy exist, additional models are required. A crucial aspect of democratic myth-making is ongoing communal exploration to identify moral dilemmas for fostering ethical behavior and values. For instance, the climate crisis poses a global challenge with diverse local impacts, complicating the implementation of restrictive policies. In this scenario, promoting emotional transformation and solidarity with others through local instances of reflection, self-restraint, and actions to advance the common good can be crucial in garnering support for globally pertinent measures.</p><p>To conclude, democratic myth-making is a community process. It can never be used for imposing values from above. One contemporary threat to democracy is the fact that almost all politicians pay lip-service to democratic values, even as they promote policies that neither produce actual equality nor actual power to decide over the conditions of life. Democracy is undermined by democratic discourse when the latter is not translated into real conditions of life. To prevent the erosion of democratic discourse, working with democratic myth-making may create a process where different communities are allowed to participate meaningfully in the formulation of regulative ideals in relation to existential threats. In this sense, democratic myth-making is utopian and can create legitimacy around common fundamental ideals, even as different political projects negotiate how they should best be implemented.</p>","PeriodicalId":51578,"journal":{"name":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","volume":"32 2","pages":"310-320"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8675.12782","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Constellations-An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8675.12782","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Against the background of growing populist and authoritarian movements in the United Staes, Europe, India, and Russia, political myths and their use have become a topic of theoretical contention (Bauman 2017a, 2017b; Reich 2015). Some authors have argued that political myths—for example, narratives of rise and decline or of origins—are a populist tool foreign to the principles of rational liberal democracies (Abizadeh, 2004; Eatwell and Goddwin 2018; Green 2014, 119–130; Müller 2016). But the more radically political myths are positioned in opposition to the good governance of liberal democracy, the more difficult it becomes to explain the resurgence of populism in contemporary politics. An alternative opinion maintains that myths are in fact a necessary part of identity-building. Whether in the context of nation-building and the establishment of strong identities (Hosking and Schöpflin 1997) or as a significant basis for radical forms of social self-assertion (Bottici 2009; Errejón and Mouffe 2015), myths play a fundamental role. Yet, if myth is pervasive and will not cease to exist independently of rational attempts at debunking it, the question of how to evaluate myth becomes all the more important. How is it possible to distinguish between myths that are detrimental to democratic institutions, procedures, and values, and myths that encourage democratic forms of participation, subjectivity, and political action, and that strengthen values like equality and justice?
In this article, I seek to combine interpretive and conceptual perspectives in 20th century history in order to propose a normative analysis of political myths. In particular, I argue that in our recent history, there have been two different models of myth-making: fascist myths, on the one hand, and the more recent development of populist myths, on the other. One important distinguishing feature is the way in which these two models organize emotions.
In the following, I will first define political myths as a historical phenomenon and then introduce the concept of emotional analogy to distinguish fascist from populist leader myths. With the help of the Spanish philosopher María Zambrano (1904–1991), I will further use this analysis to develop a third, democratic model of myth-making. I suggest to use this model as a heuristic to guide democratic practices in creatively criticizing and (re)working political myths today.
As Martha Nussbaum rightly maintained, myth-making is part and parcel of democracy because like any other form of government, democracy relies on emotions that keep it alive (Nussbaum 2013). In a time where myths are being weaponized for authoritarian politics, democratic societies need to harness democratic myths that are capable of organizing and strengthening a democratic emotional core. If such myths are to be effective, political theorists have to study the historically specific ways in which myths have mobilized and channeled emotions for different purposes. Zambrano's discussion is particularly helpful in this respect because it acutely delineates fascist myth-making and insists on democratic alternatives. Furthermore, her work can be seen as an ongoing philosophical and literary actualization of mythical tropes that she reinterpreted in order to safeguard and promote democratic values in the face of fascism. She called those tropes “guides” and employed them with much practical insight to account for the emotional growth, regulative ideals, and political subjectivity that she identified with democratic political change.
Zambrano fought on the side of the Republic in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), and witnessed the growth of national Catholicism and fascism in Spain. When Franco won the war, she went into exile in various parts of Latin America and Europe and did not return to Spain until 1986, where she remained until her death in 1991. It was against the lived experience of exile and totalitarianism that Zambrano proposed guides as a tool to promote democratic values and political practices. She began writing on myths at a time when fascists and Nazis dominated the public space through the mythic leader-gestalt: der Führer-Mythos (Kershaw, 1980). In Spain, Franco similarly styled himself as “El Caudillo,” and in Italy Mussolini became “Il duce”—titles that carried connotations of their bearers’ mythological and quasi-religious connection with the people. Beneath the emotional and violent onslaught of fascist mythical narratives, Zambrano's “guides” can be seen as an attempt to create democratic myths that could contribute to the survival of democratic ideals and democratic political subjects.
Political myths are narratives that combine elements from a concrete or imagined past and actualizes them in a symbolically significant manner in the present (Fulbrook 1997, 73). As such, they contain ideas about a future society or ideals that are to be realized in the future. Sacred myths turn into political myths once they are strategically applied to achieve political goals and, therefore, carry, promote, and represent ideological elements (Flood 2013, 41–43). Myths are furthermore often distinguished in the literature from ideology, where the latter is defined as a system of rational and coherent arguments. Myths are distinguished by their narrative and symbolical structures as well as the fact that they operate with an emotional logic (McGuire 1987). However, in actual politics, myths often go hand in hand with ideological arguments, sustaining arguments with dramatic representation or as substitution of gaps in the argument with emotional value (Flood 2013, 115–125). Political myths are furthermore narratives that rely on symbolism and its immediate recognition by the receiver. Their strong symbolizing power forms part of our lived experience of the present, as something we adhere to consciously or as an immediate and “banal” part of everyday experiences (Bottici 2009, 246). National monuments and ideas about national character are typical elements of political myth in everyday life.
The recognition of mythical elements is “banal” because they are historically inherited through a process similar to what Ernst Cassirer called “symbolic pregnance.” According to Cassirer, in everyday life, we combine elements into larger groups based on inherited rules of combination. Myth is one such set of rules, and symbolical pregnance denotes the inherited meanings by which an individual combines new perceptions (Cassirer 1955b, 191–204). For Cassirer, myth is a symbolic form that integrates perception, emotions, will, and knowledge. Bottici suggests something similar when she discusses the “condensational capacity” of political myths (2009, 252). And Blumenberg speaks of the relation between the elements of myth and their inherited meaning as “iconic consistency” and notes that this is what makes a myth symbolically powerful and culturally significant (1990, 150). Due to symbolic pregnancy and iconic consistency, myths may give the impression of conveying unhistorical universal features (Barthes 1972, 142, 151; Munz 1956, 1–16). However, each element of a particular myth is imbued with meaning from previous historical renderings, which are actualized in the present as rules for perception. Political myths gain universality as a particular form of experience precisely because they have a history.
In this sense, myths order the contents of our experiences through what could be described as an emotional logic. Cassirer argued that it is characteristic of myths to order perceptions in such a way as to represent all things as ontologically equal and interchangeable. Myths order lived experiences through emotions and desires, rather than reason, influencing elements of human perception so that similar things come to be processed as identical (Cassirer 1955a, 67–69). Cassirer saw myths as determined by their own inner logic. But since he believed that myths would eventually be superseded by reason, he failed to see that myths interact with reason in order to produce symbolic power. And while his view of myths contains historical aspects—for example, the way in which symbolic pregnance established rules through history—the emphasis on myth as a form of experience tended to universalize its ordering function. In particular, Cassirer's analysis did not pay closer attention to the ways in which the ordering function of political myths changes through history. As a result, the idea of democratic myth-making could not make sense to him.
Expanding on aspects of Cassirer's argument, I understand political myths as an emotional order of experience that functions by way of what I describe as emotional analogy, which structures experience by emotionally grouping together things that are not in fact the same. It is through emotional analogy that political myths render similar and interchangeable what is at the same time recognized as rationally distinct. Emotional analogy is a work with emotions taking place through myth-making in some cases where two elements have previously been recognized as rationally distinct through an exercise of reason. Emotions as well as reason interact with each other in political myths. Furthermore, I argue that the way in which emotional analogies connect what is rationally distinct changes over time, that is, emotional analogy ties myth to reason in historically specific ways.
María Zambrano, an author relatively unknown in the English-speaking world, focused her philosophical project on countering fascist myth-making. Before discussing the three dimensions of democratic myth-making, it is important to contextualize Zambrano's discussion of myth within her larger philosophical framework. Her writings, spanning from before the Spanish Civil War and World War II (1936–1945) until the 1960s, can be seen as a study of myths that aimed to challenge what she perceived as the “idolatrous constitution” of European societies (Zambrano, 2011, 405).
Zambrano's use of myths and narratives to counteract fascism was rooted in the belief that human life constantly needed to reinvent itself through work and expression, guided by the principle of truths (2011a, 475). According to Zambrano, the initial reaction of a human being to their surroundings is to create histories, symbols, and lies to legitimize their desires. She believed that the act of perceiving is always an interested narrative, reflecting an engaged encounter with the world that encompasses both reason and emotion (2011c, 1011–1012). Much like Cassirer, Zambrano believed that experience always occurs in a form which has developed as an expression of desire and will in the human being. But unlike Cassirer, she did not believe that reason was any less an expression of desire and will than, for example, myth. Reason and myth were different forms of human expression.
Human expression was furthermore determined by what Zambrano called necessity: a term that connected individual experiences with material conditions. Necessity was the actual material conditions of a given situation, the circumstances in which individuals expressed themselves. But the circumstances were corresponded by the necessary individual conviction of how to act to answer to those circumstances. Zambrano called such actions labor and argued that conviction on the appropriate actions in a particular situation was connected to the values or ideals that guided activity (Zambrano 2015a, 271). In El sueño creador (The creative dream, 1986, written in the 1960s), Zambrano wrote that truth appears to us as an insinuated final goal, as a horizon, or as a reason to continue moving forward (2011c, 1013). The truth or ideals that function as goals could never be fully known, and they were always intuited and directed human actions like an aim that could not be fully envisioned. Zambrano equated truth with “the autonomy of one own's being” (autonomía del propio ser, 2011c, 1043), taking autonomy as the possibility to act for change. The inability to fully realize ideals was what made autonomous action possible, and autonomy was a goal realized by attempts to actualize other ideals. In sum, human life was the expressive product of the necessary reactions and actions in front of the material circumstances; a labor that was guided by as of yet unfulfilled ideals and values.
It is noteworthy that laboring toward autonomy was foundational to defining individuality, as well as enabling the formation of political subjects. In her work Los intelectuales en el drama de España, Zambrano utilizes the concept of “el pueblo” to represent the collective resistance against the Franco uprising. Although her language may seem populist, she characterizes the people as those inherently linked to the state or as the “new man” (Zambrano 2015a, 150, 170). It is important to contextualize this concept within the book, a compilation of writings from the Spanish Civil War, where “the people” she mentions specifically came together—irrespective of party affiliations—to safeguard the Second Republic from the revolutionary fascist forces. The people acted as the political subject who defended the democratically elected government from a revolutionary fascism that made use of a concept of people rooted in blood and faith. Upholding her belief that democracy went hand in hand with the autonomy of political subjects who could affect change in their circumstances, she argued for the role of poetry and culture in order to mobilize people capable of withstanding Franco fascism and its foreign supporters in Germany and Italy (Zambrano 2015a, 179–194). Additionally, she refuted definitions of the people who equaled it to the masses, a collective of individuals or the commoners (Zambrano 2015a, 124). The concept of “the new man” represented a unified group with diverse political agendas but a shared commitment to safeguarding democracy, state integrity, and equality. This interpretation aligns with her subsequent definitions of democracy, totalitarianism, and fascism later in her life.
Zambrano characterized a democratic society as consistent with two fundamental beliefs: the possibility and historical necessity of changing material circumstances, and the inclusivity of practical and idea-formulating work for change across all parts of society (2011a, 500–501). She argued that all mythical narratives, including fascism, corresponded to the human need to be guided by values and ideals (Zambrano 2011b, 195-198). However, totalitarianism, encompassing both fascism and Nazism, grew strong due to a lack of alternative guiding ideals and values (2011a, 442). Her analysis of totalitarianism, together with her general view of the human being as expressive, was determining for her ideas on democratic myth-making. Totalitarianism established a mythical narrative with an absolute goal, such as the messianic Third Reich in Germany or the Catholic state in Spain, without recognizing the ongoing search for truth through reinvention and self-expression. Fascist myths were used as a tool to present the masses with an already given truth, underpinned by violence as a means of realizing that truth, and it intended to create a time-less reign in which every possible action was contained in the agency of the omnipresent leader (Zambrano 2011a, 442). It did not permit the people to change their own conditions (Zambrano 2015a, 124). It left no room for continuous expression or communal exploration of appropriate actions in a given circumstance. Instead, it enforced emotional exaltation, finality, and inevitability, excluding individuals from the continuous expressive search for truth that is fundamental to human life (Zambrano 2011a, 430–431).
In Persona y democracia (Person and democracy, 1958), Zambrano argued that the Nazi regime's rise to power was rooted in the suppressed feelings of various minority groups who felt powerless to act in their social circumstances Zambrano 2011b, 391-392, 404, 426). As a result, they placed their agency in the hands of a leader who assumed the role of a divine idol and was worshipped as all-powerful. However, this idolatry came at a cost, as all idols require sacrifices. The stronger the connection between the idol and society, the more victims it demanded (406–408). Zambrano observed that the complete exaltation of an individual could only be achieved through the total transgression of the law. Collaborators who expressed adoration did so because they believed that by disregarding all laws and rationality, they could act and create from nothing, as if they were gods themselves (427–428). This belief was closely tied to intense emotions. Fascism was characterized by passionate and radical voluntarism, where the collective will was embodied by the leader (439).
In conclusion, Zambrano highlighted how the aspiration to become gods posed a constant threat in societies where material circumstances and the need for change were not met with sound-guiding principles (Zambrano 2011a). While myths and utopic dreams could easily lead to the historical crimes committed by fascism, they were also necessary for formulating narratives that guided individuals toward the realization of autonomy and truth (1043). Zambrano emphasized the importance of literature and drama in countering the spread of fascist culture and social norms (2016b, 483). She believed that democratic ideas should be presented in a narrative style that could have transformative effects.
Zambrano's understanding of human life as fundamentally an expressive search for truth led her to identify the need for mythic practices that entailed emotional transformation toward feelings of reflective conviction and perseveration in acting for change. The two interconnected ideas will be discussed in the following as the dimensions of emotional transformation and of regulative ideals. Both allowed her to conceptualize the process through which such emotional transformation could occur: a process that centered on what she called “the guide.” While Zambrano primarily focused on how individuals could act to uphold values and emotional conviction, her discussion also provides insights into how democratic myth-making can shape political subjects capable of change, which I refer to as the dimension of political subjectivity.
In the previous sections, I have outlined a model for democratic myth-making that enables the distinction between democratic myths and other historical models of myth-making, such as the fascist myth and the contemporary populist myth. One crucial way to differentiate between them is the manner in which they organize emotions through emotional analogy and the emotional value they confer to different ideals and contents. Fascist myths employed an emotional analogy that allowed the leader to embody ideals as absolute, even as those ideals changed over time. In contrast, myths function differently in neoliberal societies, where our emotions are heavily influenced by individual consumption choices. Populist myths utilize an emotional analogy that bestows emotional value to the structure of ironic interchangeability.
Democratic myth-making can serve as an aesthetic tool for emotional organization around goals and the conviction of the necessity to act in situations where we face complex political and economic challenges with no easy answers, and where the outcomes of politics have life-changing consequences. That is achieved through a process of reflection and emotional transformation. Democratic myths employ an emotional analogy that connects actions to regulative ideals, imbuing certain actions with emotional value as if they can produce the desired outcomes, even in seemingly impossible situations where change appears difficult to achieve.
Ultimately, democratic myth-making contributes to the formation of a subject who recognizes the need for personal transformation through the experiences of others. It fosters solidarity in the face of mutual life-threatening problems, transcending personal or group differences. Democratic myths achieve this by enticing individuals to emotionally invest in regulative ideals that require continuous deliberation and by facilitating emotional identification with the example of someone whose circumstances are not exactly the same. This emotional solidarity may appear fragile in a contemporary context dominated by populist myths and the neoliberal market economy, which tend to individualize needs and desires. However, emotionally convinced and reflected solidarity is a crucial means of overcoming individualism without resorting to embodied identification. Democratic myth-making serves as a political tool for the ongoing work of cultivating such solidarity.
Zambrano formulated her concept of the guide during a specific era, facing particular challenges to democracy. As with political myths in general, the process of democratic myth-making requires adaptation to the historical context. Zambrano drew inspiration from Greek tragedy to illustrate her points, a choice aligned with the prevailing educational and cultural norms of her time. The example of Antigone, in particular, resonated with Zambrano's own sense of having failed to safeguard democracy. Antigone's selfless sacrifice for higher ideals mirrored Zambrano's personal ordeal of exile, symbolizing a hope for future realization of such values. It is acknowledged that in contemporary society, Antigone may not hold the same sway as a guiding exemplar, indicating the necessity for diverse democratic myths to counter different contemporary challenges. The model of democratic myth-making proposed here should not be regarded as an exhaustive representation, but rather as a tool for recognizing pertinent figures, images, and dilemmas that could effectively contribute to the formulation of democratic myths in the present day.
In contemporary Brazil, two generals refused to obey Bolsonaro's order to stage a coup when he, as outgoing president, was faced with the requirement to hand over power after elections. They could serve as valuable exemplars for democratic myth-making. Faced with the dilemma of following commands that defined their positions or to uphold democratic principles, they opted for the latter, risking being labeled as enemies of an illegitimate government had the coup succeeded. Similarly, in the United States, election workers in 2020 declined to partake in the vote recount or cast doubts on the election results, choosing to act in defense of democratic processes over party loyalties despite encountering pressure, threats, and defamation. Drawing on these individuals can aid in the crafting of a democratic myth designed to evoke emotional change and foster solidarity in the defense of democratic institutions. While other threats to democracy exist, additional models are required. A crucial aspect of democratic myth-making is ongoing communal exploration to identify moral dilemmas for fostering ethical behavior and values. For instance, the climate crisis poses a global challenge with diverse local impacts, complicating the implementation of restrictive policies. In this scenario, promoting emotional transformation and solidarity with others through local instances of reflection, self-restraint, and actions to advance the common good can be crucial in garnering support for globally pertinent measures.
To conclude, democratic myth-making is a community process. It can never be used for imposing values from above. One contemporary threat to democracy is the fact that almost all politicians pay lip-service to democratic values, even as they promote policies that neither produce actual equality nor actual power to decide over the conditions of life. Democracy is undermined by democratic discourse when the latter is not translated into real conditions of life. To prevent the erosion of democratic discourse, working with democratic myth-making may create a process where different communities are allowed to participate meaningfully in the formulation of regulative ideals in relation to existential threats. In this sense, democratic myth-making is utopian and can create legitimacy around common fundamental ideals, even as different political projects negotiate how they should best be implemented.