Weilun Tian , Junru Guo , Dongyan Li , Jiarui Wang
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study examines the influence of creditor protection on corporate cash holdings using the staggered implementation of Online Judicial Auctions (OJAs) in China as a quasi-natural experiment. OJAs strengthen creditors' rights to recover their claims and thus enhance creditor protection. Using a stacked sample of Chinese-listed corporates, we find that corporate cash holdings decrease significantly after OJAs are introduced. This effect is primarily driven by increased bank credit supply and improved access to corporate credit, which mitigates the precautionary demand for cash. The reduction is more pronounced among corporates in the growth stage, and those in regions with higher OJAs participation, weaker bank competition, and less favorable legal environments. These findings suggest that OJAs help reinforce credit resource allocation and improve the efficiency of legal enforcement. Furthermore, OJAs can stimulate corporates’ real investments and lower financial risks. Overall, our results underscore the critical role of creditor protection in shaping corporate cash management strategies and shed light on the value of advancing the digitalization of judicial enforcement.
期刊介绍:
Economic Modelling fills a major gap in the economics literature, providing a single source of both theoretical and applied papers on economic modelling. The journal prime objective is to provide an international review of the state-of-the-art in economic modelling. Economic Modelling publishes the complete versions of many large-scale models of industrially advanced economies which have been developed for policy analysis. Examples are the Bank of England Model and the US Federal Reserve Board Model which had hitherto been unpublished. As individual models are revised and updated, the journal publishes subsequent papers dealing with these revisions, so keeping its readers as up to date as possible.