More authentic data asset disclosure by myopic managers: Evidence from China

Abstract

Typically, myopic managers tend to disclose more forward-looking information to boost investor confidence, elevate short-term stock prices, and enhance performance-based compensation. This study develops a valuation model to examine the divergence between publicly disclosed data asset information and the book value of actual data assets. Using a sample of listed firms in China, we find that myopic managers strategically limit the disclosure of data asset information. This cautious disclosure approach proves beneficial under certain conditions, as over-disclosure can lead to market devaluation due to the contentious and uncertain valuation of data assets. Further analysis reveals that myopic managers are more likely to adopt aggressive disclosure strategies when investors exhibit strong information processing capabilities or when firms are state-owned. Quantile regression results suggest that myopic managers reduce excessive disclosure without affecting normal disclosure practices. These findings indicate that managerial short-termism, under specific institutional and informational conditions, may curb over-disclosure of controversial information and improve short-term market performance. The study underscores the importance of developing a more sophisticated and context-sensitive framework for data asset disclosure.