Reputation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: A Simple, Analytically Solvable Agents' Model.

IF 2.1 3区 物理与天体物理 Q2 PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Entropy Pub Date : 2025-06-15 DOI:10.3390/e27060639
Michał Cieśla
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study introduces a simple model, which can be used to examine the influence of reputation on expected income achieved within the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game framework. The research explores how different reputation distributions among society members impact overall outcomes by modeling a society of agents, each characterized by a reputation score that dictates their likelihood of cooperation. Due to the simplicity of the model, we can analytically determine the expected incomes based on the distribution of agents' reputations and model parameters. The results show that a higher reputation generally leads to greater expected income, thereby promoting cooperation over defection. However, in some cases, where there are more defecting individuals, the expected income reaches the maximum for agents with an average reputation, and then decreases for individuals who cooperate more. Various scenarios, including uniform, increasing, and decreasing reputation distributions, are analyzed to understand their effects on the promoted interaction strategy. Finally, we outline future extensions of the model and potential research directions, including the exploration of alternative reputation distributions, variable interaction parameters, and different payoff structures in the dilemma games.

迭代囚徒困境中的声誉:一个简单的、可解析解决的代理模型。
本研究引入了一个简单的模型,该模型可用于在迭代囚徒困境(IPD)博弈框架中检验声誉对预期收入的影响。该研究通过建立一个代理人的社会模型,探讨了社会成员之间不同的声誉分布如何影响总体结果,每个代理人都有一个声誉分数,表明他们合作的可能性。由于模型的简单性,我们可以根据代理人声誉和模型参数的分布分析确定期望收入。结果表明,较高的声誉通常会导致更高的预期收入,从而促进合作而不是背叛。然而,在某些情况下,当叛逃个体较多时,信誉一般的代理人的期望收益达到最大值,而信誉越高的代理人的期望收益越低。分析了不同的场景,包括统一、增加和减少声誉分布,以了解它们对促进交互策略的影响。最后,我们概述了模型的未来扩展和潜在的研究方向,包括探索困境博弈中的替代声誉分布、可变交互参数和不同的收益结构。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Entropy
Entropy PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
4.90
自引率
11.10%
发文量
1580
审稿时长
21.05 days
期刊介绍: Entropy (ISSN 1099-4300), an international and interdisciplinary journal of entropy and information studies, publishes reviews, regular research papers and short notes. Our aim is to encourage scientists to publish as much as possible their theoretical and experimental details. There is no restriction on the length of the papers. If there are computation and the experiment, the details must be provided so that the results can be reproduced.
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