Green game among government, enterprises, and the public: A study on the dynamics of enterprise green transformation from the perspective of Tripartite evolution

Abstract

This study utilizes a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic decisions and their influencing factors among governments, businesses, and the public during the green transformation of enterprises. Our research demonstrates that by modifying environmental regulations and subsidy levels, it is feasible to attain an optimal system equilibrium state, characterized by either stringent or lenient governmental oversight, active public participation, and the green transformation of enterprises. Furthermore, when financial incentives surpass regulatory costs, local governments are inclined to implement more stringent measures. Enterprises are incentivized to adopt environmentally sustainable practices when the economic advantages derived from emission trading and tax savings exceed the costs associated with emission reduction. Public engagement in conservation efforts intensifies when subsidies for participation exceed the related costs, underscoring the significance of effective incentives and an understanding of public attitudes. These findings provide valuable decision-making support for policymakers and corporate leaders, offering practical guidance for advancing corporate green transformation and achieving sustainable development objectives.