{"title":"Unmet Expectations: Life Scientists' Views on Biorisk and Responsibility.","authors":"Daniel Greene, David A Relman, Megan J Palmer","doi":"10.1089/apb.2024.0052","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>United States and global guidance documents and codes of conduct urge life scientists to practice a \"culture of responsibility\" by proactively managing the potential biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use information risks of their work. However, research suggests that many life scientists are unfamiliar with or disengaged from aspects of biorisk management. To better understand life scientists' beliefs and attitudes about biorisk management, we conducted a survey with 127 researchers at a prestigious U.S. university who directly manipulate DNA or RNA in living organisms, cells, and/or viruses. We found that while participants were broadly positive about their efforts to address risks and expressed a sense of responsibility to do so, most failed to meet the expectations that they hold for how often a typical scientist in their research community should consider biosafety, biosecurity, or dual-use information risks. Faculty were more likely to meet their expectations than non-faculty, and all participants were more likely to meet their expectations considering biosafety risks compared with biosecurity or dual-use information risks. Most non-faculty said that they have \"never or almost never\" considered the risk of deliberate misuse or information release with their lab. Outside of mandatory biosafety training, few had received formal education about biorisks or discussed them at lab meetings. Career incentives and the logistical burdens of biorisk management were noted as reasons for disengagement. Our results suggest that by their own standards, U.S. life scientists have significant room for improvement in their capacity for proactive biorisk management, particularly regarding biosecurity and dual-use information risks.</p>","PeriodicalId":520561,"journal":{"name":"Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association","volume":"30 2","pages":"112-123"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12179379/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1089/apb.2024.0052","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2025/6/1 0:00:00","PubModel":"eCollection","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
United States and global guidance documents and codes of conduct urge life scientists to practice a "culture of responsibility" by proactively managing the potential biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use information risks of their work. However, research suggests that many life scientists are unfamiliar with or disengaged from aspects of biorisk management. To better understand life scientists' beliefs and attitudes about biorisk management, we conducted a survey with 127 researchers at a prestigious U.S. university who directly manipulate DNA or RNA in living organisms, cells, and/or viruses. We found that while participants were broadly positive about their efforts to address risks and expressed a sense of responsibility to do so, most failed to meet the expectations that they hold for how often a typical scientist in their research community should consider biosafety, biosecurity, or dual-use information risks. Faculty were more likely to meet their expectations than non-faculty, and all participants were more likely to meet their expectations considering biosafety risks compared with biosecurity or dual-use information risks. Most non-faculty said that they have "never or almost never" considered the risk of deliberate misuse or information release with their lab. Outside of mandatory biosafety training, few had received formal education about biorisks or discussed them at lab meetings. Career incentives and the logistical burdens of biorisk management were noted as reasons for disengagement. Our results suggest that by their own standards, U.S. life scientists have significant room for improvement in their capacity for proactive biorisk management, particularly regarding biosecurity and dual-use information risks.