PUF-AQKD: A Hardware-Assisted Quantum Key Distribution Protocol for Man-in-the-Middle Attack Mitigation

Abstract

The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol utilizes quantum mechanics principles for cryptographic key exchange, ensuring absolute secrecy. Current QKD techniques are susceptible to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks due to the absence of an inherent mechanism for identity verification within the quantum channel. For authentication, these systems rely on classical or post-quantum cryptography, which diminishes the perfect security advantage provided by QKD. We present a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-based authenticated QKD protocol (PUF-AQKD), which avoids the necessity for authenticated classical channels and is useful in mitigating MITM attacks. The fundamental concept of PUF-AQKD is to implement a phase shift in the basis used for polarizing the transmitted qubits. The phase shift is dictated by PUFs, which are anticipated to result in analogous (correlated) responses for devices manufactured under similar conditions but dissimilar responses in different conditions. An adversary lacking a correlated PUF response shared by Alice and Bob would inadvertently increase the Quantum Bit Error Rates (QBER) observed at Bob’s end. We present a mathematical model to assess the efficacy of the proposed PUF-AQKD method and perform simulations utilizing the NetSquid simulator. The mathematical analysis and simulation findings indicate that PUF-AQKD can efficiently identify eavesdroppers, even during incomplete measurements, without the necessity of an authorized classical channel.