UAP: A System Authentication Protocol for UAV Relay Communication by UAV-Assisted

Abstract

In recent years, advancements in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology have led to the emergence of the Internet of Drones (IoD), further enhanced by the capabilities of 5th generation mobile network (5G). UAVs are widely used in various applications, such as disaster assessment, material delivery, and environmental monitoring, due to their flexibility. However, operating in insecure open environments presents significant risks, making it crucial to complete tasks without exposing sensitive information to attackers or unauthorized users. Additionally, the communication range between UAVs and ground stations is often limited, and if a UAV flies beyond this range, the likelihood of mission failure increases substantially. To address these challenges, we propose a UAV-assisted Authentication Protocol (UAP) based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), leveraging 5G to enable secure relay communication between UAVs and ground stations. We provide formal proof of the protocol's logical correctness and perform cryptanalysis, demonstrating that it effectively resists various security threats, including masquerade and replay attacks. Furthermore, we evaluate the resilience of UAP against multiple security vulnerabilities using the Scyther tool. Finally, we compare our protocol with existing authentication methods in terms of application scenarios, security features, and both computational and communication overhead. We have performed simulations on a Raspberry Pi. The experiments show that UAP has a computational overhead of 0.0826 ms and a communication overhead of 0.0408 ms. The application scenarios and security features of UAP are also considered, making it a solution for UAV applications.