The conditional value of autonomy

IF 1.3 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2025-06-17 DOI:10.1111/phpr.70023

Victor Tadros

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the conditional value of autonomy. It is valuable for a person to have acted autonomously, but only conditionally on the act performed. It is good for a person autonomously to pursue a noble deed, for example, and bad for a person autonomously to kill without justification. This paper rejects two familiar views of the conditional value of autonomy – that it is always worse for a person to autonomously do what is wrong; and that it is always better for a person autonomously to comply with duty. In doing so, it clarifies the fact that value can play different roles in personal axiology and in deontology.

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自主性的条件价值

本文主要研究自治的条件价值。一个人自主地采取行动是有价值的，但这是有条件的。例如，一个人自发地追求高尚的行为是好事，而一个人自发地无正当理由地杀人则是坏事。本文驳斥了关于自治的条件价值的两种常见观点——一个人自主地做错事总是更糟糕；一个人自主地遵守义务总是更好的。在此过程中，它澄清了价值在个人价值论和义务论中可以扮演不同角色的事实。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

3.50

自引率

6.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Philosophy and Phenomenological Research publishes articles in a wide range of areas including philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophical history of philosophy. No specific methodology or philosophical orientation is required for submissions.