How media competition fuels the spread of misinformation

Abstract

Competition among news sources over public opinion can incentivize them to resort to misinformation. Sharing misinformation may lead to a short-term gain in audience engagement but ultimately damages the credibility of the source, resulting in a loss of audience. To understand the rationale behind news sources sharing misinformation, we model the competition between sources as a zero-sum sequential game, where news sources decide whether to share factual information or misinformation. Each source influences individuals based on their credibility, the veracity of the article, and the individual’s characteristics. We analyze this game through the concept of quantal response equilibrium, which accounts for the bounded rationality of human decision-making. The analysis shows that the resulting equilibria reproduce the credibility-opinion distribution of real-world news sources, with hyperpartisan sources spreading the majority of misinformation. Our findings provide insights for policymakers to mitigate the spread of misinformation and promote a more factual information landscape.