Jensen and Meckling at 50

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-11 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104116

Patrick Bolton

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article does three things: (1) it offers a slightly modernized treatment of the two well-known agency costs of external financing of Jensen and Meckling; (2) it provides a deeper exploration than they offer of the limited liability corporation, and of optimal control allocations when financial contracts are incomplete; and, (3) it assesses the lasting influence or their ideas, their multiple interpretations, as well as misinterpretations.

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詹森和梅克林在50

本文做了三件事：(1)对Jensen和Meckling两种著名的外部融资代理成本进行了略微现代化的处理；(2)它提供了比有限责任公司更深入的探索，以及金融契约不完全时的最优控制分配；并且，(3)评估了他们的思想的持久影响，他们的多种解释，以及误解。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.