Modelling False Data Injection and Denial of Service Attacks in Cyber-Physical Microgrids

Abstract

To ensure normal and efficient operation, microgrids (MGs) must fully integrate information and communication technologies into their control systems. However, this integration introduces vulnerabilities to cyberattacks that can compromise sensitive data and disrupt operations. In MGs, two distinct types of data communication flows pose cybersecurity risks. The first involves local data transfers, which occur directly between devices based on their MAC addresses. The second involves network-wide data transmission using the Internet protocol (IP). When assessing the potential impact of cyberattacks on control systems, it is crucial to consider the specific nature of the protocols in use. This research analyses the impact of cyberattacks on data transmission in MGs and develops appropriate models for well-known attack types. It introduces updated models for false data injection (FDI) and denial of service (DoS) attacks to evaluate their impact on numerical stream data in MGs. Experimental and simulation-based validations are conducted to develop accurate cyberattack models and support the design of resilient control systems. The vulnerability of MGs' secondary control to these cyberattacks is assessed through MATLAB simulations. The results indicate that the impact of each attack depends on factors such as the packet sampling time, the injected data values (for FDI attacks) and the induced delays (for DoS attacks).