On the Unconscious Conception of Causation Part II: Negationless Implications.

Abstract

Unconscious thought, as expressed in dreams, neurotic symptoms, and myths, often involves causal reasoning. This paper examines how we unconsciously perceive causality. It posits two distinctions between unconscious and conscious conceptions of causation. First, as unconscious thinking does not rely on the temporal sequencing of events, the unconscious conception of causation is atemporal; in other words, the cause is not necessarily envisioned as preceding the effect in time. Second, given that unconscious thinking operates without negation, the unconscious conception of causation does not entail counterfactual reasoning. Consequently, in our unconscious thought, we may believe that the cause leads to the effect, but we do not deduce that the absence of the cause would make the effect less likely. To address these distinctions, it is suggested that unconscious causation can be reduced to logical implication, as defined in negationless logic. This idea is supported by experimental observations on young children's understanding of causation. The paper illustrates how this concept can enhance our comprehension of clinical phenomena through clinical examples.