Ownership concentration and independent director effectiveness: Governance challenges under China's new company law

IF 5.5 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Yanqiao Zheng
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Abstract

The recently amended Company Law of China, effective July 2024, introduces new provisions aimed at strengthening the role of independent directors. This paper analyzes the impact of ownership concentration on independent directors' dissent in Chinese listed firms, drawing on board proposal and regulatory letter data. Results indicate that higher ownership concentration significantly suppresses dissent, highlighting governance challenges inherent to concentrated ownership structures. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in ownership concentration, proxied by the Herfindahl index of the top three shareholders, reduces the likelihood of dissent by 0.06 %, a substantial decline given the average dissent rate of 0.42 %. Robustness checks, including alternative concentration indices and instrumental variable approaches, validate these findings. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that ownership concentration most strongly suppresses dissent in matters concerning personnel changes, related-party transactions, equity changes, and investments, and in industries such as the Real Estate and Information Technology sectors. The paper also contrasts director qualifications, highlighting that Chinese directors are predominantly academics, whereas their U.S. counterparts typically have senior business experience, potentially affecting their oversight capabilities. Low remuneration and the absence of penalties further reduce the incentive for Chinese independent directors to dissent. Consequently, dissent by independent directors has limited value of internal oversight, with only 11 out of 4784 regulatory letters linked to prior dissent. The paper proposes stricter nomination procedures, performance-based compensation tied to governance outcomes with punitive measures for non-compliance, and tailored training programs to improve oversight. These reforms are crucial for strengthening corporate governance and safeguarding minority shareholder interests in high-concentration environments.
股权集中度与独立董事有效性:中国新公司法下的治理挑战
最近修订的《中国公司法》(2024年7月生效)引入了旨在加强独立董事作用的新条款。本文利用董事会提案和监管函件数据,分析了股权集中度对我国上市公司独立董事异议的影响。结果表明,较高的股权集中度显著抑制了异议,凸显了股权集中度结构固有的治理挑战。具体而言,以前三大股东的赫芬达尔指数(Herfindahl index)为代表的股权集中度每提高一个标准差,异议的可能性就会降低0.06%,考虑到平均异议率为0.42%,这是一个大幅下降。鲁棒性检查,包括替代浓度指数和工具变量方法,验证了这些发现。异质性分析显示,所有权集中度在人事变动、关联方交易、股权变动和投资以及房地产和信息技术等行业中最强烈地抑制了异议。论文还对董事资格进行了对比,强调中国董事主要是学者,而美国董事通常具有高级商业经验,这可能会影响他们的监管能力。低薪酬和缺乏惩罚进一步降低了中国独立董事提出异议的动机。因此,独立董事的异议对内部监督的价值有限,4784封监管信函中只有11封与先前的异议有关。该报告提出了更严格的提名程序,基于绩效的薪酬与治理结果挂钩,并对违规行为采取惩罚性措施,以及量身定制的培训计划以改善监督。这些改革对于在高度集中的环境中加强公司治理和维护少数股东利益至关重要。
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来源期刊
中国经济评论
中国经济评论 ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
10.60
自引率
4.40%
发文量
380
期刊介绍: The China Economic Review publishes original works of scholarship which add to the knowledge of the economy of China and to economies as a discipline. We seek, in particular, papers dealing with policy, performance and institutional change. Empirical papers normally use a formal model, a data set, and standard statistical techniques. Submissions are subjected to double-blind peer review.
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