Modeling and Assessing Vulnerabilities of Aircraft Cyber–Physical Power Systems Based on Complex Network Theory

Abstract

The concept of more electric aircraft (MEA) is a major trend in the aircraft industry. Compared to the conventional aircraft electrical power system (AEPS), the MEA–EPS has become more integrated and complex. The MEA–EPS demonstrates typical characteristics of a cyber–physical system (CPS) as a result of the implementation of intelligent management and information sensing techniques, thereby transforming into an aircraft cyber–physical power system (ACPPS). However, the improved architecture provides reliability while also introducing vulnerability. The methodologies used to evaluate the reliability of conventional aircraft EPS are not easily transferable to ACPPS. Therefore, it is essential to assess the vulnerability of MEA–EPS for stable operation and optimal system design. To identify the critical components and branches of MEA–EPS, this paper proposes an ACPPS framework and a modeling approach. Additionally, by applying complex network theory, the system is abstracted into an undirected network. The statistical properties of the network are examined from both structural and functional perspectives, revealing that the system exhibits a robust scale-free characteristic. Finally, four attack strategies are used to simulate random failures and malicious attacks. Simulation results indicate that the cyber-side is more fragile than the physical-side and several countermeasures are recommended to defend against attacks.