Mitigating moral hazard in insurance contracts using risk preference design

IF 0.8 4区管理学 Q4 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-06-06 DOI:10.1016/j.orl.2025.107322

Shutian Liu , Quanyan Zhu

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Preferences might be affected by exogenous inputs, such as information generated by advanced technologies. This paper proposes a thought experiment called risk preference design to investigate this influence within a class of principal-agent problems. Risk preference design has potential to mitigate moral hazard in insurance contracting. A quantitative approach is introduced to study the effects. We use a linear contract case study to demonstrate the role of risk preference design in strengthening financial security.

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利用风险偏好设计缓解保险合同中的道德风险

偏好可能受到外生输入的影响，例如先进技术产生的信息。本文提出了一个称为风险偏好设计的思想实验，以研究一类委托代理问题中的这种影响。风险偏好设计具有降低保险契约中道德风险的潜力。引入了定量方法来研究其影响。我们使用一个线性契约案例研究来证明风险偏好设计在加强金融安全中的作用。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Operations Research Letters 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

9.10%

发文量

111

审稿时长

83 days

期刊介绍： Operations Research Letters is committed to the rapid review and fast publication of short articles on all aspects of operations research and analytics. Apart from a limitation to eight journal pages, quality, originality, relevance and clarity are the only criteria for selecting the papers to be published. ORL covers the broad field of optimization, stochastic models and game theory. Specific areas of interest include networks, routing, location, queueing, scheduling, inventory, reliability, and financial engineering. We wish to explore interfaces with other fields such as life sciences and health care, artificial intelligence and machine learning, energy distribution, and computational social sciences and humanities. Our traditional strength is in methodology, including theory, modelling, algorithms and computational studies. We also welcome novel applications and concise literature reviews.