Promoting continuous emissions monitoring systems to curb rent-seeking: Evolutionary game insights

IF 13.6 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Energy Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-02 DOI:10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108639

Yang Wang , Dezhi Li , Yigang Wei , Wentao Wang

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Rent-seeking behavior (RSB), particularly in the form of carbon data fraud, undermines the effectiveness and fairness of Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV), threatening the integrity of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems (CEMS) provide a robust technical solution to combat this challenge. This study investigates optimal regulatory measures for promoting CEMS adoption and curbing RSB (PCaCR), thereby enhancing MRV reliability and ETS efficacy. A tripartite evolutionary game model was developed to simulate strategic interactions among thermal power enterprises (TPEs), third-party verifiers (3PVs), and the government. Evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) were analyzed to reveal strategic determinants and underlying mechanisms affecting stakeholders' decision-making. Results show: (1) the optimal ESS scenario occurs when TPEs voluntarily adopt CEMS, 3PVs conduct impartial verifications, and the government enforces strict supervision; (2) initial strategy choices among TPEs, 3PVs, and the government significantly influence each other's evolutionary paths; (3) strategic factors demonstrate varying degrees of sensitivity in the evolution of PCaCR, indicating that pilot policies, standard refinement, information disclosure, and reward–penalty mechanisms effectively regulate stakeholders' behaviors. This study thus provides an evolutionary game framework to analyze decision-making dynamics around CEMS adoption in the presence of rent-seeking, offering insights for robust regulatory policymaking.

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促进持续排放监测系统以抑制寻租：进化博弈的见解

寻租行为（RSB），特别是以碳数据欺诈的形式，破坏了监测、报告和核查（MRV）的有效性和公平性，威胁到排放交易计划（ETS）的完整性。持续排放监测系统（CEMS）为应对这一挑战提供了强有力的技术解决方案。本研究旨在探讨促进CEMS采用和抑制RSB （PCaCR）的最佳监管措施，从而提高MRV的可靠性和ETS的有效性。建立了一个三方博弈演化模型，模拟火电企业、第三方验证机构和政府之间的战略互动。分析了进化稳定策略，揭示了影响利益相关者决策的战略决定因素和潜在机制。结果表明：(1)生产企业自愿采用CEMS、第三方供应商公正核查、政府严格监管是ESS的最优方案；(2)企业、第三方和政府的初始战略选择显著影响彼此的演化路径；(3)战略因素在PCaCR演进过程中表现出不同程度的敏感性，表明试点政策、标准细化、信息披露和奖惩机制对利益相关者行为有有效的调节作用。因此，本研究提供了一个演化博弈框架来分析在存在寻租的情况下围绕CEMS采用的决策动态，为强有力的监管政策制定提供见解。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Energy Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

12.50%

发文量

524

期刊介绍： Energy Economics is a field journal that focuses on energy economics and energy finance. It covers various themes including the exploitation, conversion, and use of energy, markets for energy commodities and derivatives, regulation and taxation, forecasting, environment and climate, international trade, development, and monetary policy. The journal welcomes contributions that utilize diverse methods such as experiments, surveys, econometrics, decomposition, simulation models, equilibrium models, optimization models, and analytical models. It publishes a combination of papers employing different methods to explore a wide range of topics. The journal's replication policy encourages the submission of replication studies, wherein researchers reproduce and extend the key results of original studies while explaining any differences. Energy Economics is indexed and abstracted in several databases including Environmental Abstracts, Fuel and Energy Abstracts, Social Sciences Citation Index, GEOBASE, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Journal of Economic Literature, INSPEC, and more.