The evolution of competitiveness in the Chilean mobile market

IF 3.8 3区经济学 Q3 ENERGY & FUELS

Utilities Policy Pub Date : 2025-06-09 DOI:10.1016/j.jup.2025.101982

Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita , Santiago Budría Rodríguez , Shahriyar Nasirov

{"title":"The evolution of competitiveness in the Chilean mobile market","authors":"Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita , Santiago Budría Rodríguez , Shahriyar Nasirov","doi":"10.1016/j.jup.2025.101982","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study offers a comprehensive analysis of market power issues in Chile's mobile telecommunications sector and explores how these concerns have evolved since the liberalization came into force. Apart from using typical ex-post structural measures, this study's methodology includes theoretical modeling and empirical assessment to ascertain the behavior of leading operators in the market. In the theoretical modeling, we assume that operators engage in Cournot (quantity-setting) competition, characterizing equilibria under competitive and cooperative scenarios where operators may participate in either full or partial collusion. In the empirical assessment, we simulate the model using monthly data from January 2005 to June 2024 and evaluate each operator's strategic incentives to exercise market power. The results indicate that although incentives to collude may persist, the two largest operators in the market (<em>Movistar</em> and <em>Entel</em>) may have behaved more competitively in recent periods. This shift was further evidenced by the entry of the fourth operator (<em>Wom</em>) and its aggressive strategy. Despite this result, we argue that further research is needed to evaluate the evolution of the competitive environment. In addition, we suggest that the regulatory authorities should strengthen the legal framework to enhance the competitiveness of small operators and new entries, thereby reducing concentration.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":23554,"journal":{"name":"Utilities Policy","volume":"96 ","pages":"Article 101982"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8000,"publicationDate":"2025-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Utilities Policy","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957178725000979","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ENERGY & FUELS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study offers a comprehensive analysis of market power issues in Chile's mobile telecommunications sector and explores how these concerns have evolved since the liberalization came into force. Apart from using typical ex-post structural measures, this study's methodology includes theoretical modeling and empirical assessment to ascertain the behavior of leading operators in the market. In the theoretical modeling, we assume that operators engage in Cournot (quantity-setting) competition, characterizing equilibria under competitive and cooperative scenarios where operators may participate in either full or partial collusion. In the empirical assessment, we simulate the model using monthly data from January 2005 to June 2024 and evaluate each operator's strategic incentives to exercise market power. The results indicate that although incentives to collude may persist, the two largest operators in the market (Movistar and Entel) may have behaved more competitively in recent periods. This shift was further evidenced by the entry of the fourth operator (Wom) and its aggressive strategy. Despite this result, we argue that further research is needed to evaluate the evolution of the competitive environment. In addition, we suggest that the regulatory authorities should strengthen the legal framework to enhance the competitiveness of small operators and new entries, thereby reducing concentration.

查看原文本刊更多论文

智利移动市场竞争力的演变

本研究全面分析了智利移动电信行业的市场力量问题，并探讨了这些问题自自由化生效以来的演变情况。本研究除了采用典型的事后结构测量方法外，还采用理论建模和实证评估的方法来确定市场中领先运营商的行为。在理论模型中，我们假设运营商参与古诺（数量设定）竞争，描述了竞争和合作情景下的平衡，运营商可能参与完全或部分共谋。在实证评估中，我们使用2005年1月至2024年6月的月度数据对模型进行了模拟，并评估了各运营商行使市场支配力的战略激励。调查结果表明，尽管存在串通的动机，但市场上最大的两家运营商（Movistar和Entel）最近可能表现得更具竞争性。第四家运营商（Wom）的加入及其积极的战略进一步证明了这种转变。尽管有这样的结果，我们认为需要进一步的研究来评估竞争环境的演变。此外，我们建议监管部门应加强法律框架，以提高小运营商和新进入者的竞争力，从而降低集中度。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Utilities Policy ENERGY & FUELS-ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

CiteScore

6.80

自引率

10.00%

发文量

审稿时长

66 days

期刊介绍： Utilities Policy is deliberately international, interdisciplinary, and intersectoral. Articles address utility trends and issues in both developed and developing economies. Authors and reviewers come from various disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, law, finance, accounting, management, and engineering. Areas of focus include the utility and network industries providing essential electricity, natural gas, water and wastewater, solid waste, communications, broadband, postal, and public transportation services. Utilities Policy invites submissions that apply various quantitative and qualitative methods. Contributions are welcome from both established and emerging scholars as well as accomplished practitioners. Interdisciplinary, comparative, and applied works are encouraged. Submissions to the journal should have a clear focus on governance, performance, and/or analysis of public utilities with an aim toward informing the policymaking process and providing recommendations as appropriate. Relevant topics and issues include but are not limited to industry structures and ownership, market design and dynamics, economic development, resource planning, system modeling, accounting and finance, infrastructure investment, supply and demand efficiency, strategic management and productivity, network operations and integration, supply chains, adaptation and flexibility, service-quality standards, benchmarking and metrics, benefit-cost analysis, behavior and incentives, pricing and demand response, economic and environmental regulation, regulatory performance and impact, restructuring and deregulation, and policy institutions.