Zefeng Tong , Jia Liu , Dongmin Kong , Yu Qi , Fei Zhou
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper examines the ethical implications of government-firm reciprocity in the absence of election incentives and its impact on firm performance. Using hand-collected data of the position-related consumption of local officials during 2013–2017 in China, we investigate the relationship between this practice and corporate bribery. The results show that the reduction in the budget of position-related consumption leads to an increase in firms’ business entertainment expenses. Firms pay for the personal consumption of local officials through business entertainment expenses, which essentially represents a bribe to local officials. Further analysis indicates that firms bribing local officials receive more government subsidies and preferential tax deductions. However, such reciprocity does not improve firm performance. This study examines the interplay of covert bribery and unethical corporate favoritism, contributing to the business ethics and corruption literature by identifying the relationship between firm venality, government-firm reciprocity, and firm development.
期刊介绍:
The International Review of Economics & Finance (IREF) is a scholarly journal devoted to the publication of high quality theoretical and empirical articles in all areas of international economics, macroeconomics and financial economics. Contributions that facilitate the communications between the real and the financial sectors of the economy are of particular interest.