Is AI the new corporate monitor? Evidence from excessive on-the-job consumption

IF 1.8 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Lang Wu, Lili Ge
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Excessive on-the-job consumption (EOJC) represents a manifestation of corporate agency problems that ultimately undermines firm value. As artificial intelligence (AI) applications permeate various aspects of corporate operations, this study examines AI’s impact on EOJC. Analyzing 2788 Chinese manufacturing firms (2007–2022), we find AI implementation significantly reduces EOJC by dissolving hierarchical information barriers to enhance governance quality and curbing managerial discretion through algorithm-driven decision protocols. Further analysis reveals that AI exerts stronger governance effects in highly competitive industries by augmenting existing market discipline mechanisms, while synergizing with information-transparent firms to amplify monitoring efficacy. These findings reveal AI’s potential for institutional transformation in corporate governance systems.
人工智能是新的企业监督者吗?工作中过度消费的证据
过度在职消费(EOJC)是企业代理问题的一种表现形式,最终会损害企业价值。随着人工智能(AI)应用渗透到企业运营的各个方面,本研究探讨了AI对EOJC的影响。通过对2788家中国制造企业(2007-2022)的分析,我们发现人工智能的实施通过消除分层信息壁垒来提高治理质量,并通过算法驱动的决策协议来抑制管理自由裁量权,从而显著降低了EOJC。进一步分析表明,人工智能通过增强现有的市场纪律机制,在高度竞争的行业中发挥更强的治理作用,同时与信息透明的企业协同作用,放大监管效果。这些发现揭示了人工智能在公司治理体系的制度变革方面的潜力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Economics Letters
Economics Letters ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.00%
发文量
348
审稿时长
30 days
期刊介绍: Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.
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