Do shareholders vote against executive compensation when pay is misaligned with performance?

IF 1.2 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
James Jianxin Gong , Nian Lim Lee (Vic) , Sophia I. Wang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Using the most recently available data on compensation actually paid (CAP) to CEOs and non-CEO executives, we document a strong and positive relationship between CAP-based pay-performance misalignment and shareholder Say-on-pay (SOP) votes against executive compensation (SOP dissent). The positive relationship between CAP-based misalignment and SOP dissent is stronger when equity constitutes a greater portion of compensation and is weaker when total shareholder return is used to determine CEO non-equity incentive payout. The findings are robust to the use of alternative measures of CAP-based pay-performance misalignment and SOP dissent as well as to the use of an entropy-balanced sample. In contrast, when pay-performance misalignment is based on summary compensation table (SCT) pay, we find an insignificant relationship between pay-performance misalignment and SOP dissent. Overall, we find strong empirical support that shareholders consider CAP-based pay-performance misalignment when casting their SOP votes.
当薪酬与业绩不一致时,股东是否会投票反对高管薪酬?
利用ceo和非ceo高管实际支付薪酬(CAP)的最新可用数据,我们证明了基于CAP的薪酬绩效偏差与股东对高管薪酬的话语权(SOP)投票(SOP异议)之间存在强烈的正相关关系。当股权在薪酬中所占比例较大时,基于cap的偏差与SOP异议之间的正相关关系更强,而当股东总回报用于确定CEO非股权激励支出时,这一正相关关系较弱。研究结果对基于cap的薪酬绩效偏差和SOP异议的替代措施的使用以及熵平衡样本的使用都是稳健的。相反,当薪酬失调是基于总结薪酬表(SCT)薪酬时,我们发现薪酬失调与SOP异议之间的关系不显著。总体而言,我们发现强有力的实证支持,股东考虑基于cap的薪酬绩效偏差时,他们的SOP投票。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Advances in Accounting
Advances in Accounting BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
6.20%
发文量
29
期刊介绍: Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting continues to provide an important international forum for discourse among and between academic and practicing accountants on the issues of significance. Emphasis continues to be placed on original commentary, critical analysis and creative research.
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