James Jianxin Gong , Nian Lim Lee (Vic) , Sophia I. Wang
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Using the most recently available data on compensation actually paid (CAP) to CEOs and non-CEO executives, we document a strong and positive relationship between CAP-based pay-performance misalignment and shareholder Say-on-pay (SOP) votes against executive compensation (SOP dissent). The positive relationship between CAP-based misalignment and SOP dissent is stronger when equity constitutes a greater portion of compensation and is weaker when total shareholder return is used to determine CEO non-equity incentive payout. The findings are robust to the use of alternative measures of CAP-based pay-performance misalignment and SOP dissent as well as to the use of an entropy-balanced sample. In contrast, when pay-performance misalignment is based on summary compensation table (SCT) pay, we find an insignificant relationship between pay-performance misalignment and SOP dissent. Overall, we find strong empirical support that shareholders consider CAP-based pay-performance misalignment when casting their SOP votes.
期刊介绍:
Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting continues to provide an important international forum for discourse among and between academic and practicing accountants on the issues of significance. Emphasis continues to be placed on original commentary, critical analysis and creative research.