Factoring Financing: A Critical Factor in Channel Choice and Performance in E-Commerce Supply Chains

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Tiantian Li;Jianwen Luo
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Abstract

As e-commerce platforms play an increasingly important intermediary role in supply chains, manufacturers must decide between two sales models offered by platforms: business-to-consumer (B2C), where manufacturers sell directly to consumers, and business-to-business-to-consumer (B2B2C), where manufacturers sell to a platform that markets products to consumers. Manufacturers operating in the B2B2C channel typically sign profit-margin-guarantee (PMG) contracts requiring them to ensure minimum profit margins for the platform under specified conditions. While providing manufacturers with sales opportunities, this exacerbates the financial burden on small- and medium-sized manufacturers (SMEs) with limited capital. This article explores the optimal financing decisions and sales channel choices for manufacturers under the factoring financing (FF) model, where manufacturers sell their accounts receivable to a factor entity to alleviate liquidity constraints. We find: 1) The initial accounts receivable level significantly influences manufacturers’ sales channel choice—when accounts receivable are low, the B2B2C channel's PMG contracts may not be advantageous for manufacturers, but when they are high, dual-channel operations (B2C and B2B2C) may benefit the platform, although manufacturers’ gains might be limited. 2) Higher FF ratios do not consistently enhance manufacturers’ performance, as overreliance on financing can increase operational risks. 3) Although conventional wisdom suggests that manufacturers should lower wholesale prices to mitigate the pressures of PMG contracts, platforms can foster beneficial arrangements by reducing the PMG rate, which improves supply chain efficiency. We develop a theoretical framework for channel choice, contract design, and financing strategies, providing actionable insights for SMEs to optimize e-commerce supply chain operations.
保理融资:电子商务供应链渠道选择与绩效的关键因素
随着电子商务平台在供应链中扮演越来越重要的中介角色,制造商必须在平台提供的两种销售模式之间做出选择:企业对消费者(B2C),制造商直接向消费者销售,以及企业对企业对消费者(B2B2C),制造商向向消费者销售产品的平台销售。在B2B2C渠道中运营的制造商通常签署利润率保证(PMG)合同,要求他们在特定条件下确保平台的最低利润率。在为制造商提供销售机会的同时,这加剧了资金有限的中小型制造商(sme)的财务负担。本文探讨保理融资(FF)模式下制造商的最优融资决策和销售渠道选择,即制造商将其应收账款出售给保理实体以缓解流动性约束。我们发现:1)初始应收账款水平显著影响制造商的销售渠道选择,当应收账款水平较低时,B2B2C渠道的PMG合同可能不利于制造商,但当应收账款水平较高时,双渠道运营(B2C和B2B2C)可能有利于平台,尽管制造商的收益可能有限。2)较高的FF比率并不能持续提高制造商的绩效,因为过度依赖融资会增加运营风险。3)尽管传统观点认为制造商应该降低批发价格以减轻PMG合同的压力,但平台可以通过降低PMG率来促进有益的安排,从而提高供应链效率。为中小企业优化电子商务供应链运营提供了渠道选择、合同设计和融资策略的理论框架。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
19.00%
发文量
604
审稿时长
5.3 months
期刊介绍: Management of technical functions such as research, development, and engineering in industry, government, university, and other settings. Emphasis is on studies carried on within an organization to help in decision making or policy formation for RD&E.
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