Francesco Marchionne , Noemi Giampaoli , Matteo Renghini
{"title":"Institutions and financial crises","authors":"Francesco Marchionne , Noemi Giampaoli , Matteo Renghini","doi":"10.1016/j.ecosys.2024.101267","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how institutional quality affects the probability of banking and sovereign debt crises using a panel of 138 countries from 1996 to 2017. Individually, proxies of institutional quality capture different institutional dimensions and suffer from measurement errors. Jointly, we find that their impact is heterogeneous, and multicollinearity slightly biases the estimates: measures more closely related to regulatory quality and corruption mitigation decrease the probability of financial instability, while those oriented toward social capital have perverse effects. This evidence questions the beneficial effect of institutions. On the contrary, when we extract the common component of institutional quality from multiple imprecise measures using a principal component analysis, better institutions unambiguously reduce the probability of financial distress. Such a shielding effect occurs regardless of whether institutions are considered exogenous or endogenous. Financial structure, cultural differences, and international agreements do not affect our findings. Estimates are robust to several econometric exercises.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51505,"journal":{"name":"Economic Systems","volume":"49 2","pages":"Article 101267"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Systems","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S093936252400089X","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We examine how institutional quality affects the probability of banking and sovereign debt crises using a panel of 138 countries from 1996 to 2017. Individually, proxies of institutional quality capture different institutional dimensions and suffer from measurement errors. Jointly, we find that their impact is heterogeneous, and multicollinearity slightly biases the estimates: measures more closely related to regulatory quality and corruption mitigation decrease the probability of financial instability, while those oriented toward social capital have perverse effects. This evidence questions the beneficial effect of institutions. On the contrary, when we extract the common component of institutional quality from multiple imprecise measures using a principal component analysis, better institutions unambiguously reduce the probability of financial distress. Such a shielding effect occurs regardless of whether institutions are considered exogenous or endogenous. Financial structure, cultural differences, and international agreements do not affect our findings. Estimates are robust to several econometric exercises.
期刊介绍:
Economic Systems is a refereed journal for the analysis of causes and consequences of the significant institutional variety prevailing among developed, developing, and emerging economies, as well as attempts at and proposals for their reform. The journal is open to micro and macro contributions, theoretical as well as empirical, the latter to analyze related topics against the background of country or region-specific experiences. In this respect, Economic Systems retains its long standing interest in the emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe and other former transition economies, but also encourages contributions that cover any part of the world, including Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, or Africa.