Government subsidy strategies for new energy vehicle charging infrastructure considering consumers’ low-carbon preference: A tripartite evolutionary game model

Abstract

To address the issue of supply-demand imbalances between charging infrastructure and new energy vehicles (NEVs), targeted subsidy for charging infrastructure is a key policy tool. However, the effects of the subsidy policies are inconsistent. In the literature, limited research on the subsidy strategies for charging infrastructure has considered consumers' low-carbon preference, which plays a key role in the development of NEVs. The aim of this paper is to analyze the subsidy strategies of NEV charging infrastructure considering consumers' low-carbon preference. A tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed among the government, auto manufacturers and consumers. The impacts of the initial willingness of each participant and external parameter on evolution of strategies are simulated, revealing the mechanism of subsidy strategy on the development of NEVs. The results of the study show that the government's strategy choice is least affected by the initial willingness of the parties, and largely affected by the level of government subsidies. In addition, consumers' low-carbon preference level, government subsidy level and fuel price have the greatest impact on the strategies of auto manufacturers and consumers, and the government can choose to regulate fuel price and increase low-carbon publicity to alleviate the financial pressure.