Punitive but discerning: Reputation can fuel ambiguously deserved punishment, but does not erode sensitivity to nuance.

Abstract

The desire to appear virtuous can motivate people to punish wrongdoers, a desirable outcome when punishment is clearly deserved. Yet claims that "virtue signaling" is fueling a culture of outrage suggest that reputation concerns may inspire even potentially unmerited punishment. Moreover, might reputation do more to drive punishment in ambiguous situations, where punishment is less clearly deserved, eroding punishers' sensitivity to moral nuance? Across eight studies focused on the U.S. political context (total n= 15,472 Americans from MTurk and Prolific), we show that reputation can drive ambiguously deserved punishment. In situations involving politicized moral transgressions, including those where the case for punishing the transgressor is judged to be relatively ambiguous, subjects expect punishers to be perceived positively by co-partisans, and punish at higher rates when punishing is observable to a co-partisan audience. Moreover, reputation can drive punishment in ambiguous situations even among individuals who personally question the morality of punishment, highlighting the power of reputation to push people away from their values. Yet we find no evidence that reputation erodes sensitivity to nuance by doing more to drive punishment in more ambiguous situations. Instead, subjects expect punishment to look better when more unambiguously deserved, and making punishment observable does as much or more to drive punishment in unambiguous than ambiguous situations-even when the co-partisan audience is strongly ideological (and so might have been expected to encourage undiscerning punishment). We thus suggest that reputation can make people more punitive, even in ambiguous situations, but does not diminish sensitivity to nuance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).