A Deflationary Account of Information in Terms of Probability.

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that information is nothing more than an abstract object; therefore, it does not exist fundamentally. It is neither a concrete physical entity nor a form of "stuff" that "flows" through communication channels or that is "carried" by vehicles or that is stored in memories, messages, books, or brains-these are misleading metaphors. To support this thesis, I adopt three different approaches. First, I present a series of concrete cases that challenge our commonsensical belief that information is a real entity. Second, I apply Eleaticism (the principle that entities lacking causal efficacy do not exist). Finally, I provide a mathematical derivation showing that information reduces to probability and is therefore unnecessary both ontologically and epistemically. In conclusion, I maintain that information is a causally redundant epistemic construct that does not exist fundamentally, regardless of its remarkable epistemic convenience. What, then, is information? It is merely a very efficient way of describing reality-a manner of speaking, nothing more.