Does the legal enforcement environment constrain earnings management in social enterprises? Evidence from microfinance institutions

Hubert Tchakoute Tchuigoua
{"title":"Does the legal enforcement environment constrain earnings management in social enterprises? Evidence from microfinance institutions","authors":"Hubert Tchakoute Tchuigoua","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2025.101684","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The microfinance sector, with its diverse ownership structures and distinctive capital structure, provides a unique setting to examine cross-country differences in financial reporting practices. However, research on how the legal enforcement environment affects the financial reporting quality of development finance organizations, such as microfinance institutions (MFIs), remains limited. This study hypothesizes that higher financial reporting quality is associated with earnings that are less subject to earnings management. We assess financial reporting quality using abnormal loan loss provisions as a proxy for earnings management. Analyzing a global dataset of MFI financial statements spanning 15 years (2003–2017), we find that financial reporting quality is higher in weaker legal enforcement environments. This suggests that when enforcement is weak, investors rely less on accounting information, leading to less earnings management and higher financial reporting quality. In addition, our results suggest that for-profit MFIs and those less dependent on subsidies engage in less upward earnings management in weak enforcement environments.","PeriodicalId":501001,"journal":{"name":"The British Accounting Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"101684"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The British Accounting Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2025.101684","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The microfinance sector, with its diverse ownership structures and distinctive capital structure, provides a unique setting to examine cross-country differences in financial reporting practices. However, research on how the legal enforcement environment affects the financial reporting quality of development finance organizations, such as microfinance institutions (MFIs), remains limited. This study hypothesizes that higher financial reporting quality is associated with earnings that are less subject to earnings management. We assess financial reporting quality using abnormal loan loss provisions as a proxy for earnings management. Analyzing a global dataset of MFI financial statements spanning 15 years (2003–2017), we find that financial reporting quality is higher in weaker legal enforcement environments. This suggests that when enforcement is weak, investors rely less on accounting information, leading to less earnings management and higher financial reporting quality. In addition, our results suggest that for-profit MFIs and those less dependent on subsidies engage in less upward earnings management in weak enforcement environments.
法律执行环境是否制约了社会企业的盈余管理?来自小额信贷机构的证据
小额信贷部门拥有多样化的所有权结构和独特的资本结构,为研究财务报告实践的跨国差异提供了独特的环境。然而,关于执法环境如何影响小额信贷机构(MFIs)等发展金融组织的财务报告质量的研究仍然有限。本研究假设较高的财务报告质量与较少受盈余管理影响的盈余相关。我们使用异常贷款损失拨备作为盈余管理的代理来评估财务报告质量。通过分析跨越15年(2003-2017)的全球小额信贷机构财务报表数据集,我们发现在较弱的执法环境中,财务报告质量更高。这表明,当执行力较弱时,投资者对会计信息的依赖程度较低,从而导致盈余管理减少,财务报告质量提高。此外,我们的研究结果表明,在执行力弱的环境中,营利性小额信贷机构和那些对补贴依赖程度较低的小额信贷机构较少参与向上的盈余管理。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信