Two-player rationalizable implementation

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2025-05-20 DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2025.106031

Ritesh Jain , Ville Korpela , Michele Lombardi

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The paper characterizes the class of two-player social choice functions implementable in rationalizable strategies under complete information.

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合理的双人执行

研究了完全信息下可合理化策略下的二人社会选择函数。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

12.50%

发文量

135

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.